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ABSTRACT
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a series of recent cases, has restricted
personal jurisdiction over corporate defendants-and foreign
corporations in particular. The Court's restrictions are-although a
peripheral concern-motivated by an interest for international comity
and an effort to bring US jurisdiction rules more in line with other
nations' laws. However, an in-depth comparative analysis between the
EU Brussels Regulation and U.S. Supreme Court opinions reveals that
the Supreme Court's decisions remain deeply grounded in the
traditional US paradigm of personal jurisdiction. Predictability
appears to have different meanings to the EU legislator and the U.S.
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Supreme Court. For the Supreme Court, predictability comes at the
price of restricting both general and specific jurisdiction to limit
exposure of the alien defendant o fewer potential forums. The Brussels
Regulation, in contrast, provides an exhaustive list of special heads of
jurisdiction. It takes into account the interests of defendants, plaintiffs,
and the forum state. The Regulation's use of clearly defined connecting
factors, combined with European rejection of judicial discretion, could
serve as a model to mitigate the shortcomings of the current US regime.
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After decades of inactivity, the issue of personal jurisdiction over
foreign corporate defendants with little to no physical presence in the
forum state has resurfaced on the agenda of the U.S. Supreme Court'
and is attracting attention from the legal community both domestically
and internationally.2 Until recently, American courts have treated
personal jurisdiction generously, to say the least. Since International
Shoe Co. v. Washington (International Shoe),3 most lower federal and
state supreme courts have asserted personal jurisdiction over foreign
or domestic out-of-state corporate defendants 4 whenever the
corporation has engaged in sufficiently "continuous, systematic and
substantial" activity in the forum state.5 This broad criterion, while
difficult enough to comprehend in domestic cases, proves particularly
daunting in the international setting.
1. See Henry S. Noyes, The Persistent Problem of Purposeful Availment, 45
CONN. L. REV. 41, 43 (2012) ("Prior to the two personal jurisdiction cases that the
Supreme Court promulgated in 2011, it had been nearly twenty-five years since the
Supreme Court last considered whether a state court may exercise personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant who has no physical presence in the forum jurisdiction.").
2. See generally Kate Bonacorsi, Not at Home with 'At-Home" Jurisdiction, 37
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1821 (2014); Patrick J. Borchers, One Step Forward and Two Steps
Back: Missed Opportunities in Refining the United States Minimum Contacts Test and
the European Union Brussels I Regulation, 31 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (2014); Donald
Earl Childress III, General Jurisdiction and the Transnational Law Market, 66 VAND. L.
REV. EN BANC 67 (2013); Cassandra Burke Robertson & Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, The
Business of Personal Jurisdiction, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 775 (2017); Linda J.
Silberman, The End of Another Era: Reflections on Daimler and its Implications for
Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 675 (2015)
[hereinafter Silberman End]; Gwynne L. Skinner, Expanding General Personal
Jurisdiction over Transnational Corporations for Federal Causes of Action, 121 PENN ST.
L. REV. 617 (2017). For foreign commentary, see, for example, Lauren Reynolds & Mark
Zimmer, Die Einschrdnkung der Extraterritorialen Zustdindigkeit Amerikanischer
Gerichte durch den US Supreme Court, RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 509
(2013) (Ger.); Joachim Zekoll & Michael Schulz, Neue Grenzen fur die International
Zustdndigkeit Amerikanischer Gerichte, 60 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT
321, 324-27 (2014) (Ger.); Sarah Migliorini, Jurisdiction of US Federal Courts on Non-
US-based Companies for Violations of Human Rights, CAMBRIDGE INT'L L.J. (Mar. 12,
2014), http://cilj.co.uk/2014/03/12/jurisdiction-federal-courts-non-us-based-companies-
violations-human-rights-occurring-abroad-recent-case-law-us-supreme-court/
[https://perma.cclX9UU-3VF4] (archived Sept. 14, 2018).
3. Compare Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) [hereinafter Intl
Shoe] (addressing specific jurisdiction), with Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining
Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) [hereinafter Perkins] (regarded as the "paradigm case" for
general jurisdiction).
4. As discussed later in this article, US personal jurisdiction rules apply equally
to foreign and domestic out-of-state corporate defendants. Therefore, in the following,
and unless indicated otherwise, "out-of-state" refers to both domestic and foreign out-of-
state defendants.
5. See Robertson & Rhodes, supra note 2, at 779 n. 16 (noting that before Daimler
"[t]reatises printed as black letter law that corporations were subject to general
jurisdiction wherever they engaged in a sufficiently high level of business activity" and
that a leading casebook presented it as settled law).
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Foreign corporations have faced lawsuits before US courts in cases
with-in their eyes-little connection to the forum state in situations
where their own domestic courts would typically deny jurisdiction.
6
Combined with special features of US procedural and substantive law
such as class actions, contingent fees, discovery, and punitive damages,
the U.S. Supreme Court's "minimum contacts rule"7 exasperates alien
companies 8 and has spurred protest from foreign governments. 9
Though consternation over the US legal system may sometimes be
exaggerated or emanate from false or incomplete information, 1o
studies indicate foreign companies doing business in the United States
rank "fear of legal liability" as among their top concerns." They view
"the legal system as a drawback regarding investment in the United
States" and are concerned with the high legal costs and a perceived
lack of predictability and litigation fairness,12 which puts the United
States at a competitive disadvantage in attracting foreign investment
despite its otherwise business-friendly regulatory environment.'
3
6. See Rolf Stiirner, Der Justizkonflikt zwischen U.S.A. und Europa, in DER
JUSTIZKONFLIKT MIT DEN VEREINIGTEN STAATEN VON AMERIKA 3, 6-9, 20 (Walther J.
Habscheid ed., 1986) (Ger.) (providing numerous examples).
7. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 ("[D]ue process requires only that in order to
subject a defendant o a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory
of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'").
8. See Ralf Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1003,
1006 (2006) ("Europeans are said to fear U.S. courts like medieval torture chambers;
they regularly regard assertions of jurisdiction by U.S. courts as acts of judicial
hegcmonialism."); see also Michael Vitiello, Limiting Access to U.S. Courts: The Supreme
Court's New Personal Jurisdiction Case Law, 21 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 209, 212
(2015) (suggesting that due to the differences in procedural rules such as the broad US
discovery rules foreign companies "may seek to avoid the jurisdiction of American
courts").
9. See Daimler A.G. v. Bauman, 571 U.S 117, 141-42 (2014) [hereinafter
Daimler] (holding that the Court was informed by the Solicitor General "that 'foreign
governments' objections to some domestic courts' expansive views of general jurisdiction
have in the past impeded negotiations of international agreements on the reciprocal
recognition and enforcement of judgments."'); see also Stiirner, supra note 6, at 7; Brief
of Government of Switzerland as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Soci6t6
Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. United States District Court for the District of
Iowa, 482 U.S. 522 (1986).
10. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE U.S. LITIGATION ENVIRONMENT AND FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT SUPPORTING U.S. COMPETITIVENESS By REDUCING LEGAL COSTS
AND UNCERTAINTY 6 (2008), https://www.trade.gov/investamerica/LitigationFDI.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5A7Y-ZJDC] (archived Aug. 28, 2018) ("[The highly complex and
fragmented nature of our legal system has led to a perception that penalties are arbitrary
and unfair, a reputation that may be overblown, but nonetheless diminishes our
attractiveness to international companies.").
11. Id. at 5-6 (citing EUROCHAMBRES CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & U.S. CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE, OBSTACLES TO TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT 10-12 (2005)).
12. Id. at 6.
13. The United States is consistently ranked among the top countries in the world
for ease of doing business. See MCKINSEY & COMPANY, SUSTAINING NEW YORK'S AND THE
US' GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 77, http://www.nyc.gov/html1/om/pdfl
[voL. 51:12431246
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The United States is not alone, however, in providing "exorbitant
jurisdiction." 14 European countries allow plaintiffs access to their
courts based on rules that are deeply concerning from an American
perspective. 15 Legal commentators have called the difference in
opinions and concepts a "justice conflict" between the United States
and predominantly civil law European jurisdictions. 16 This
disharmony has impeded international treaty negotiations, 17 and
prevents mutual recognition of judgments 18 while also placing
ny-report.final.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2018) [https://perma.cc/UK2U-9QNC] (archived
Aug. 28, 2018) (finding New York underperformed compared to London when it comes to
a fair and predictable legal environment and only about 15 percent of the surveyed senior
executives "felt that the US [legal] system was better than the UK's in terms of
predictability and fairness, while over 40 percent favored the UK in both these regards");
see also Rankings & Ease of Doing Business Score, THE WORLD BANK,
http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings (last visited Mar. 19, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/2WV6-4K38] (archived Aug. 28, 2018).
14. See Kevin M. Clermont & John R.B. Palmer, Exorbitant Jurisdiction, 58 ME.
L. REV. 474, 476 (2006) (defining "[e]xorbitant jurisdiction" as a "jurisdiction exercised
validly under a country's rules that nevertheless appears unreasonable because of the
grounds necessarily used to justify jurisdiction").
15. See Michaels, supra note 8, at 1007-08 (pointing towards jurisdiction based
on the nationality of the plaintiff, the presence of the defendant's property, or where a
tort was committed in certain European countries).
16. Jurisdiction is but one aspect of the conflict. Europeans criticize wide-
reaching US discovery rules, punitive damages, and the US contingency fee, while
Americans are critical about far-reaching EU privacy rules and limitations on freedom
of expression. See id. at 1006 (referring to American outrage over "France asserting
jurisdiction over Yahoo! on the mere basis that its website was accessible from French
computers"); see also Samuel P. Baumgartner, Is Transnational Litigation Different?, 25
U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1297, 1317-38 (2004) (describing the evolution of the justice
conflict between the United States and Germany). See also generally Stiirner, supra note
6.
17. See generally Audrey Feldman, Note, Rethinking Review of Foreign Court
Jurisdiction in Light of the Hague Judgments Negotiations, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2190
(2014). The original round of negotiations for the Hague Judgments Project ran between
1996 and 2001 and sought to draft a treaty that would regulate not only jurisdiction
internationally but also recognition and enforcement of foreign judegments. This round
failed, however, in part due to American delegates' perception that the treaty provisions
would be incompatible with Due Process Clause provisions in the U.S. Constitution's
Fourteenth Amendment and the prevailing "minimum contacts" test. Discussions
resumed in 2012 but do not deal with personal jurisdiction regulation to avoid the pitfalls
of the subsequent round. Instead, it seeks to regulate the recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgment through "jurisdictional filters," which allow the court located where
enforcement is sought to review the jurisdiction of the court of origin. See id. at 2193.
18. See generally Samuel P. Baumgartner, How Well do U.S. Judgments Fare in
Europe?, 40 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 173 (2008).
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economic burdens on plaintiffs and defendants. 19 Recent Supreme
Court decisions suggest that this may be about to change.2 0
In a series of cases decided between 2011 and 2017, the Supreme
Court appeared to take steps toward gradually restricting personal
jurisdiction over corporate defendants in general-and foreign
corporations specifically. In J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Robert
Nicastro (McIntyre), the Court limited specific jurisdiction in a product
liability case requiring the plaintiff to show that the corporate
defendant intended to "conduct [] activities within the forum State"
where the injury had happened, 21 thereby denying personal
jurisdiction-where, ironically, European courts would have granted
it. 2
2
In both Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown
(Goodyear)23 and Daimler A.G. v. Bauman (Daimler), the Court limited
general personal jurisdiction over alien corporations xcept for
"exceptional case[s]"24-to their "place of incorporation and principal
place of business,"25 in an attempt to bring US rules more in line with
international approaches.26
The two most recent cases confirm the trend toward an
increasingly narrow and more formalistic approach to personal
jurisdiction over out-of-state corporate defendants.2 7 Though mainly
dealing with issues of venue, in BNSFRailway Co. v. Tyrrell (BNSF),28
19. Instead of focusing on the substantive matter of the dispute, parties may have
to spend considerable time and money on litigating the court's competence to even hear
the case. See Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A
C LREV. 1256, 1294-95 (1981) (discussing the hard-to-
measure opportunity costs legal uncertainty creates with regard to innovation).
20. See Robertson & Rhodes, supra note 2, at 787 ("[T]he need of foreign
companies for protection against litigation in U.S. courts is less today than it has been
in decades, in both absolute and comparative dimensions.').
21. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 881 (2011) [hereinafter
McIntyre] (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) [hereinafter Hanson]).
22. See Borchers, supra note 2, at 4 ("Mhe English defendant clearly would have
been subject to jurisdiction were New Jersey part of the E.U. and not the United
States."); Feldman, supra note 17, at 2205 (discussing a "reverse-McIntyre" case under
EU jurisdiction rules).
23. See generally Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915
(2011) [hereinafter Goodyear].
24. Daimler A.G. v. Bauman, 571 U.S 117, 139 n.19 (2014).
25. Id. at 137 ("With respect to a corporation, the place of incorporation and
principal place of business are 'paradig[m] . . . bases for general jurisdiction."'); see also
Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (explaining to assert general jurisdiction over foreign
corporations, the Supreme Court required the defendant to essentially be "at home" in
the forum state).
26. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 141 ("Other nations do not share the uninhibited
approach to personal jurisdiction advanced by the Court of Appeals in this case. . .").
27. See Robertson & Rhodes, supra note 2, at 788 ("[alfter a century of being
widely discredited, legal formalism has made a comeback into the heart of American
legal practice").
28. See generally BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017) [hereinafter
BNSF].
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the Supreme Court, applying its holding from Daimler, found BNSF's
contacts to the forum were in no way substantial enough to form an
''exceptional case," nor "of such a nature as to render the corporation
at home in that State."29 In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court
(Bristol-Myers),3 0 the Court held that a state court has jurisdiction over
a nationally operating corporation only if all plaintiffs were injured in
the forum state, de facto limiting nationwide class actions and mass
joinders to the corporation's place of incorporation or principal place of
business, notwithstanding the judicial remedy of federal multidistrict
litigation.3 1
While Goodyear and Daimler have already produced considerable
commentary,32 the most recent cases have less so.3 3 It is yet unclear
whether the decisions indeed revolutionize personal jurisdiction
rules,3 4 clarify precedent previously applied inconsistently by lower
29. Id. at 1553.
30. See generally Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773
(2017) [hereinafter Bristol-Myers].
31. Id. at 1784 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority opinion will
"result in piecemeal itigation and the bifurcation of claims"). For the decision's impact
on class actions and multidistrict litigation, see generally Andrew D. Bradt & D.
Theodore Rave, Aggregation on Defendants' Terms: Bristol-Meyers Squibb and the
Federalization of Mass-Tort Litigation, 59 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018),
https://ssrn.comlabstract=3082527 [https://perma.cc/AZ6K-UXSS] (archived Sept. 14,
2018).
32. Previous articles have commented on the 2011 and 2014 cases either from a
domestic perspective (see generally Vitiello, supra note 8), or they have compared isolated
aspects of the US and EU approach to personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Borchers, supra
note 2; Ronald A. Brand, Access-to Justice Analysis on a Due Process Platform, 112
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 76 (2012); Linda J. Silberman, The Impact of Jurisdictional
Rules and Recognition Practice on International Business Transactions: The U.S.
Regime, 26 HOUS. J. INT'L. L. 327 (2004) [hereinafter Silberman Impact]; Samuel P.
Baumgartner, The External Dimensions of the European Law of Civil Procedure-A
Transatlantic Perspective (Univ. of Akron Sch. of Law Legal Stud. Research Paper Series,
2016), http://ssrn.comlabstract=2742330 [https://perma.cc/8QSF-2V25] (archived Sept.
14, 2018). Michaels, supra note 8, provides an in-depth comparison of the US and EU
jurisdictional "paradigm," but his thorough analysis has in part been overturned by the
recent Supreme Court decisions and changes in EU law. The present Article attempts a
comprehensive comparison between the current US and EU approach to personal
jurisdiction over foreign corporate defendants.
33. See generally Alexandra Wilson Albright, Personal Jurisdiction, 30 APP.
ADVOC. 9 (2017); Bradt & Rave, supra note 31; Todd E. Pettys, From Playgrounds to
Plavix: Civil Cases in the Supreme Court's October 2016 Term, 53 COURT REV. 98, 104-
05 (2017); The Supreme Court 2016 Term: Leading Case: Federal Jurisdiction &
Procedure - Personal Jurisdiction-BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, 131 HARV. L. REV. 333
(2017).
34. See Robertson & Rhodes, supra note 2, at 782 (calling the Supreme Court's
decision in Daimler a "major change" requiring "re-writing every first-year Civil
Procedure casebook, as the "continuous and systematic" test had been previously viewed
as well-settled law). But see Patrick J. Borchers, The Twilight of the Minimum Contacts
Test, 11 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 3 (2014) (arguing that three out of four of the Supreme
Court's 2011 and 2014 decisions were "utterly predictable" suggesting that they may be
less revolutionary than some commentators think); John T. Parry, Rethinking Personal
Jurisdiction after Bauman and Walden, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 607, 610 (2015)
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courts,3 5 or raise more new questions in the place of those questions
answered.36 Policy considerations, as expressed by Justice Sotomayor
in her dissenting opinions for Daimler, BNSF, and Bristol-Myers, could
serve as a future point of contention for the Court. Additionally, the
role of international law in formulating these jurisdictional rules has
barely been addressed in either case law or scholarly commentary.
Based on a comparative analysis of jurisdictional rules in the
United States and Europe, this Article discusses whether the
renovated US paradigm of personal jurisdiction is apt to govern
personal jurisdiction of global market realities in an equitable and
effective manner. The Article analyzes how the two most recent
decisions contribute to further defining jurisdiction in relation to
foreign corporate defendants and the degree to which they help-or
hurt-to reconcile opposing views both in and outside the United
States. It argues that the Supreme Court's decisions since 2011,
though importing certain elements of EU law into US jurisprudence,
remain deeply grounded in the traditional US paradigm of jurisdiction,
leading to inconsistent results and a lack of a theoretically sound
personal jurisdiction doctrine,3 7 despite the Supreme Court's concern
for other nations' divergent jurisdiction rules as expressed in
Daimler. 38 This Article suggests that, in order to improve
predictability and trust in the fairness of the US judicial system
internally and internationally, an entirely different approach, which
breaks with traditional notions, may be needed. One way to achieve
this goal could be to adopt the formalistic model of the EU Brussels
Regulation3 9 and limit general personal jurisdiction while expanding
specific jurisdiction in a way that is predictable, equitable, and in line
with constitutional due process requirements.
To this effect, Part II discusses the meaning and function of
personal jurisdiction in the United States and the European Union and
analyzes the role of international law as a source for jurisdictional
(arguing that Daimler and Walden achieve little more than "disposing of Nicastro" by
"reanimating the "minimum contacts plus reasonable test").
35. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781 ("[O]ur settled principles regarding
specific jurisdiction control this case.").
36. See also Robertson & Rhodes, supra note 2, at 790-94 (discussing
"unanswered questions" such as the "scope of the relatedness requirement for specific
jurisdiction"). See generally Silberman End, supra note 2 (discussing several open
questions arising out of the Supreme Court's Daimler decision).
37. See Andrew L. Strauss, Beyond National Law: The Neglected Role of the
International Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 373, 390 (1995)
(suggesting "[d]octrine-makers fail in their craft when their legal doctrines do not
accurately reflect the underlying paradigm").
38. See Daimler A.G. v. Bauman, 571 U.S 117, 141 (2014) (referencing EU rules
of general jurisdiction).
39. Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
12 December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments




rules. Part III reviews the development of Supreme Court precedent
and identifies the main sources and characteristics of US personal
jurisdictional rules. It summarizes the recent decisions in BNSF and
Bristol-Myers and places them within the earlier Supreme Court
precedent. It also examines policy concerns raised by the minority
opinions in Daimler, BNSF Railways, and Bristol-Myers. Part IV
compares the US approach to that of the European Union and selected
individual EU countries, particularly Germany, where much of the
academic literature on the alleged US-EU justice conflict originates. It
identifies fundamental differences and analyzes the degree of and
prospects for convergence between the two jurisdictional regimes. Part
V concludes.
II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION: TERMINOLOGY, FUNCTION, AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Rules of personal jurisdiction in the United States allow the
adjudicating authority to determine whether it is competent to render
a judgment against a particular defendant.40 Various interests are at
stake when developing rules that govern jurisdiction of domestic courts
over foreign corporate defendants. Accordingly, jurisdictional rules can
fulfill different functions in different jurisdictions.4 1 Before examining
the content and underlying rationale of the existing US and EU rules,
it is necessary to first gain a basic understanding of what personal
jurisdiction actually means. The following subpart compares the
meaning and function of the terms used to describe personal
jurisdiction in the United States and foreign legal systems.
40. In light of this function, and in reference to the adjudicatory authority, the
terms adjudicatory or jurisdictional jurisdiction are often used synonymously. See
Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared and
Evaluated, 63 B.U. L. REV. 279, 282-83 (1985) (defining adjudicatory jurisdiction as "the
willingness of a given politically organized society to furnish the law-applying agency-
usually, but not necessarily, a court-for the adjudication of a matter involving
significant elements that are not domestic to that society" and differentiating
adjudicatory from jurisdictional jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction and venue).
41. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017)
("In determining whether personal jurisdiction is present, a court must consider a
variety of interests."); see also Stephen E. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95 TEX. L. REV.
1249, 1252 (2017) (arguing "[a]s general law, jurisdiction is something on which different
court systems can disagree").
2018J] 1251
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A. Terminology and Function
Under US law, personal jurisdiction is a court's power to hear a
case depending on the identity of the parties in the suit.42 An out-of-
state party who believes it is unfair to stand trial before the courts of
that foreign state can object based on lack of personal jurisdiction.4 3
Personal jurisdiction is different from venue-the territorial allocation
of cases within a state's jurisdiction.4 4
Concepts similar to that of personal jurisdiction exist in foreign
countries. However, terminology and function differ. The common
terminology in many civil law jurisdictions is not personal jurisdiction,
but "international competence."45 Unlike rules of personal jurisdiction
in the United States, international competence determines jurisdiction
exclusively in the international context, even in countries with a
federal political system, such as Germany.46 International competence
deals with the distribution of judicial power between sovereign
countries, while the territorial allocation of a case to a court in Berlin
or Munich-though these two cities are located in different German
federal states (Ldnder)-is a question of venue (6rtliche
Zustdndigkeit). 47 A court typically decides on international
competence by its own motion.48 An appeal may be based on the lack
42. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) ("Historically, the
jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their de
facto power over the defendant's person ... ").
43. See Michaels, supra note 8, at 1032-33 (observing that in the United States
jurisdiction is seen as "public intrusion into the defendant's freedom").
44. Both a lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction and improper venue are
available to a defendant as grounds to dismiss suit. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)-(3). Venue is
governed by federal statute (see 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2012)), and operates exclusively from
personal jurisdiction. See Polizi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 345 U.S. 663, 665 (1953) ("In
a case where [28 U.S.C. § 1391] applies, if its requirements are not satisfied, the District
Court is not deprived of jurisdiction, although dismissal of the case might be justified if
a timely objection to the venue were interposed."). In either case, if a court finds that it
lacks personal jurisdiction or is not a suitable venue, it must dismiss the case. Such a
decision, like all judgments, are available to appeal, or can be brought in a more suitable
forum.
45. Internationale Zustdndigkeit in German speaking countries such as
Germany, Switzerland, or Austria; comp6tence internationale in French.
46. See Christof von Dryander, Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial Matters
under the German Code of Civil Procedure, 16 INT'L L. 671, 672-73 (1982) (noting
German states do not "enjoy jurisdictional power," and, in contrast to the United States,
"there is only one system of courts of general jurisdiction").
47. See ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], Title 2, §§ 12-
37, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/zpo/ (Ger.); see also Code de Proc6dure Civile
[C.P.C.] [CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE] Chapitre II: La Comp6tence Territoriale,
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070716 (Fr.).
48. See REINHOLD GEIMER, INTERNATIONALES ZIVILPROZESSRECHT 665 (2015)
(Ger.) (noting defendant can waive his right to object to an internationally incompetent
court); Brussels Regulation, supra note 39, art. 28 (providing that "the court shall declare
of its own motion, that it has no jurisdiction unless its jurisdiction is derived from the
provisions of the Regulation").
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of international competence, but not on a lack of territorial (venue) or
subject-matter jurisdiction.49
The difference in terminology reflects an important difference in
function.5 0 International competence determines if the country's court
system as a whole has the authority to decide an international case, or
whether the courts of another country are better suited to adjudicate.5 1
This is similar to the function of choice of law rules, but different from
the way personal jurisdiction is currently conceptualized in the United
States.5 2 First, US jurisdiction rules decide not whether the US court
system, in general, has jurisdiction over a foreign defendant, but if a
particular federal or state court has jurisdiction.5 3 Second, US personal
jurisdiction rules do not assign competence between sovereign
jurisdictions but determine if the defendant, as a function of
constitutional due process, can fairly and reasonably be expected to
stand trial in the state where she or he has been sued.54
In some foreign civil law jurisdictions, courts will determine if
they have "judicial power" over the defendant separately from their
international competence.5 5 "Judicial power" means that a country has
the authority to submit certain foreign persons or organizations (such
as diplomats, international organizations, or foreign states) to the
jurisdiction of its domestic courts.5 6 As an issue of sovereignty between
nations, this is mainly a question of international law. While a
defendant may appeal a judgment rendered by an internationally
49. See ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], Title 2, § 513,
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/zpo/ (Ger.). However, the ability of the defendant to
invoke international incompetence on appeal requires that the defendant has objected to
the court's lack of international competences before making an appearance in oral
argument on the merits before the court of first instance. See GEIMER, supra note 48, at
39.
50. See Michaels, supra note 8, at 1018 (suggesting that Americans and
Europeans do not mean the same thing by "jurisdiction" and that this fundamental
difference is a reason for why the negotiations for an international convention on
jurisdiction and recognition of judgments at the Hague failed).
51. See Reinhard Patzina, in 1 MUNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUR
ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG, 195 (Wolfgang Kriger & Thomas Rauscher eds., 2016) (Ger.)
(noting that international competence distributes jurisdictional tasks between countries,
but that international law prohibits one country from assigning judicial power to another
sovereign country).
52. See Peter Hay, The Interrelation of Jurisdiction and Choice-of-Law in United
States Conflicts Law, 28 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 161, 183 (1979) (advocating for
synchronization of jurisdiction and choice of law rules).
53. See J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884 (2011)
("[P]ersonal jurisdiction requires a forum-by-forum, or sovereign-by-sovereign,
analysis."). But see id. at 904 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (suggesting that a foreign
defendant is responsible for its actions on the territory of the United States as a whole
as opposed to the territory of the state of incorporation of its US subsidiary).
54. See generally Michaels, supra note 8.
55. See Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz [GVG] [Courts Constitution Act], 1975,
BUNDESGESETZBLATF (BGBL) at Title 1, §1 (Ger.); Legge 31, Art. 3 maggio 1995, n.218,
in G.U. June. 3, 1995, n.128 (It.).
56. See, e.g., Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2012).
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incompetent court, a decision rendered by a court without "judicial
power" leads to the judgment being void.5 7 In the United States, other
Anglo-Saxon countries, and also in Austria-a civil law country- both
issues fold into a single personal jurisdiction analysis.5 8
B. International Sources
Surprisingly absent from the current debate is the role
international law plays in determining personal jurisdiction in cases
involving an international element which, for the purpose of this
discussion, this Article will call "international jurisdiction."5 9 Legal
commentators have analyzed differences between and convergences of
countries' systems of jurisdictional rules. 60 They have advocated for an
international agreement on jurisdiction and recognition of judgments,
but have rarely examined existing general rules of international law
as a possible source of-or limitation to-international jurisdiction, or
have quickly discarded them as irrelevant. 61 Discussion of
international law typically is limited to questions of immunity,62 while
international jurisdiction is treated as a matter of domestic law.63
57. Patzina, supra note 51, at 200 (arguing that if a court has no judicial power
over the defendant, a decision rendered by that court will not have any effect on the
defendant; therefore, that decision will be void).
58. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2012) (stating "a foreign state shall be immune from the
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States"); see also Patzina, supra
note 3I, - 11 Agmii Aistriin .Englid I., fur examnple, do not distinguish
between international competence and judicial power).
59. The term combines elements of international competence and personal
jurisdiction. It excludes domestic intrastate cases.
60. See generally Baumgartner, supra note 32.
61. See HAIMO SCHAcK, INTERNATIONALES ZIVILVERFAHRENSRECHT 87 (2014)
(Ger.) (stating that there are no rules of international law that limit a state's power to
determine when its courts should have jurisdiction over international cases). But see
Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 1, 16-20 (1987) (reviewing the importance of international law for judicial
jurisdiction from the nineteenth century until the enactment of the 1968 Convention on
the Jurisdiction of Courts and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, as amended, 21 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 304) 77 (1978)
[hereinafter Brussels Convention]).
62. See William S. Dodge, The Customary International Law of Jurisdiction in
the Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law, OPINIO JURIS (Mar. 8, 2018, 2:01
AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2018/03/08/the-customary-international-law-of-jurisdiction-
in-the-restatement-fourth-of-foreign-relations-law/ [https://perma.cclMPA4-A8Y4]
(archived Aug. 27, 2018) (quoting RESTATEMENT FOURTH OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE U.S., intro. note, Part III (Am. Law Inst., Jurisdiction Tentative Draft No.
2, 2016) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT FOURTH]) ("With the significant exception of various
forms of immunity, modern customary international law generally does not impose limits
on jurisdiction to adjudicate.").
63. See GEIMER, supra note 48, at 360 (stating that international law ideally
should distribute international competence among nations; however, in the absence of
international customary law countries are free to develop their own rules).
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1. Supreme Court Precedent on International Law
In line with this thinking,6 4 the U.S. Supreme Court has not
applied international law in the limited number of international
personal jurisdiction cases it has decided to date. In Helicopteros
Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall (Helicopteros)65 and Perkins v.
Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. (Perkins),66 the Court applied the
minimum contacts test that had been developed for domestic
defendants in International Shoe to foreign defendants without even
mentioning international law, nor addressing whether this domestic
standard was proper for the international character of the case.6 7
In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court (Asahi), the Court
acknowledged "that unique factors are involved in asserting personal
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant." 68 Nevertheless, it did not
discuss how relevant rules of international law were to the case.69
Similarly, in Goodyear, the Court discussed the international character
of the case, ultimately requiring a corporation's foreign subsidy to
essentially "be at home" in the forum state.70 Nevertheless, like in
previous decisions, these limitations were based on the Court's
application of the domestically slanted minimum contacts test without
any mention of rules of international law.
Some federal courts have used what has been referred to as the
"aggregate" or "national contacts" test ii international cases.71 Under
this test, when searching for minimum contacts to establish
jurisdiction over an alien corporate defendant, courts have analyzed
the defendant's contacts with the United States "as a whole" rather
than its contacts in individual US states.72 However, they have done
so using the same rules of personal jurisdiction used for domestic cases,
and the majority of state and federal courts refuse to treat personal
jurisdiction over foreign defendants as different from that over
64. This thinking is now also reflected in RESTATEMENT FOURTH, supra note 62.
See Dodge, supra note 62 (stating that contrary to RESTATEMENT (THIRD), "[t]he
Restatement (Fourth) does not have a . . . section restating the customary international
law on jurisdiction to adjudicate because . . . modern customary international law
generally does not impose limits on jurisdiction to adjudicate").
65. See generally Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408
(1984) [hereinafter Helicopteros].
66. See generally Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S 437 (1952).
67. See Born, supra note 61, at 6.
68. Strauss, supra note 37, at 386 (citing Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior
Court of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1985) [hereinafter Asahi]).
69. See id.
70. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 929 (2011)
(holding that a corporation's foreign subsidiaries that are "in no sense at home" in the
forum state cannot be required to submit itself to that forum's general jurisdiction).
71. See Borchers, supra note 2, at 20 ("[T] here is strong lower court authority that
under the Fifth Amendment, the standard is minimum contacts with the United States
as a whole, rather than with the particular forum state . .
72. Born, supra note 61, at 9-10.
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domestic defendants.7 3 The Supreme Court in McIntyre rebuked the
aggregate contacts test, holding that "personal jurisdiction requires a
forum-by-forum, or sovereign-by-sovereign, analysis . .. Because the
United States is a distinct sovereign, a defendant may in principle be
subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States but not of
any particular State."74 In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg, with passing
reference to international law, argued that the UK defendant targeted
"the United States as a single market" as opposed to just the state of
New Jersey, where the product liability suit in question arose, but
where the defendant maintained no physical presence.7 5 However, the
reference to international law in Justice Ginsburg's opinion solely
served to overcome the majority's argument hat the UK defendant did
not "purposefully avail" itself of jurisdiction in New Jersey, not as a
legal basis for personal jurisdiction over the foreign corporate
defendants, which remained anchored in due process requirements per
the U.S. Constitution.76
Finally, in Daimler, the majority opinion noted that "the
transnational context of this dispute bears attention"7 7 and expressly
considered other nations' diverging perspectives on personal
jurisdiction, stating: "Other nations do not share the uninhibited
approach to personal jurisdiction advanced by the Court of Appeals in
this case."7 8 Nevertheless, as in previous holdings, the Court did not
look to rules of international law to resolve the issue of personal
jurisdiction over Germany-based company Daimler AG. Instead, it
referred to US constitutional law, stating: "Considerations - of
international rapport thus reinforce our determination that subjecting
73. See id. at 6-10 (analyzing Supreme Court precedent, state and federal
decisions, and concluding that the majority refuses to apply different standards to
international defendants); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 421
cmt. f (AM. LAw INST. 1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT THIRD] ("In the United States,
the criteria for determining the reasonableness of an exercise of jurisdiction to adjudicate
by State courts are generally similar to those for federal courts, but they are applied on
a local (State) rather than a national basis. Thus, the courts of a State of the United
States may exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate pursuant to paragraphs (b) and (c) of
Subsection (2) only if the person in question has his domicile or residence in that State;
pursuant to paragraphs (h), (i), and (j) only if the business or activity is carried out or
has effect in that State; and pursuant to paragraph (k) only if the thing is situated in
that State. Jurisdiction to adjudicate on the basis of United States nationality or
citizenship in accordance with Subsection (2)(d) may be exercised by State courts
pursuant to federal statute; whether they can do so on the authority of the State alone
has not been determined. It may not be unreasonable for a State to exercise jurisdiction
to adjudicate on the basis of State citizenship in a limited category of cases. Compare §
402, Reporters' Note 5.").
74. See J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884 (2011).
75. Id. at 905 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
76. Id. ("McIntyre UK, by engaging McIntyre America to promote and sell
machines in the United States, 'purposefully availed itself' of the United States market
nationwide. . .").
77. Daimler A.G. v. Bauman, 571 U.S 117, 119 (2014).
78. Id. at 141 (referencing EU law).
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Daimler AG to the general jurisdiction of courts in California would
not accord with the 'fair play and substantial justice' due process
demands." 7 "Fair play and substantial justice" are elements of
personal jurisdiction under the United States' Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause as developed by the Supreme Court.
There is no international custom that these criteria are-or should
be-the guiding principles when determining personal jurisdiction. On
the contrary, foreign laws use different factors and legal commentators
have long criticized the United States for relying on such imprecise
notions for determining personal jurisdiction.8 0 The elements of "fair
play and substantial justice" are therefore not general principles of
international law and the Supreme Court certainly does not intend to
treat them as such. Rather, by linking "considerations of international
rapport" to due process, the Court tries to pay tribute to other
countries' sovereignty while remaining within the contours of its own
precedent.81
As laudable as the Court's respect for foreign countries' interests
may be, qualifying them as an element of due process seems
theoretically flawed. Consideration of international rapport is nothing
more than international comity and, as such, part of diplomatic
relations. "Fair play and substantial justice" as developed by the
Supreme Court, on the other hand, protect the right of the defendant
to a fair trial under the Due Process Clause, sidelining the interests of
the international legal community for more predictable or
internationally harmonized jurisdictional rules.
One could argue that consideration of other nations' more limited
approaches to jurisdiction protects the defendant from being sued in a
court the defendant could not reasonably expect to be competent to
judge her case based on her home state jurisdictional rules. A
disappointment of these expectations would have significantly more
severe consequences for the foreign defendant who, expecting a court
in Germany, is instead enjoined as a defendant in a US court, versus
her domestic counterpart, who might expect to be a party before a New
York court rather than a court in California. The foreign defendant
risks navigating a legal system that differs dramatically from the one
she is familiar with, including discovery practices, legal fees, and
amount of potential damages. 82 Ultimately, to meet fairness and
justice requirements, this would result in a separate due process test
for foreign defendants, which would require the foreign defendant to
79. Id. at 142.
80. See, e.g., SCHACK, supra note 61, at 181 (criticizing the Supreme Court's use
of the term "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" in Asahi as an "empty
shell').
81. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 142.
82. See Born, supra note 61, at 39 (arguing "[flor these reasons, requiring a
foreign defendant to litigate in the United States, rather than in another country, has
major consequences and can impose significant hardship").
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have stronger contacts in the forum than a domestic defendant."
Though this may constitute a theoretically sound solution, it
represents a far more radical departure from Supreme Court precedent
than the international comity considerations in Daimler.
2. The Role of General International Law for Personal Jurisdiction
Why is it that international law receives such little attention as a
source for personal jurisdiction rules, and what role could it potentially
play? As jurisdiction over foreign persons is inherently international,
some commentators have argued for an international law of
jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters.8 4 However, its potential
role is heavily disputed. 85 Some argue that there is no room for
international law in adjudicatory jurisdiction because it leaves the
sovereignty of other nations untouched. The judgment itself, they
argue, does not have any effect on the territory of the foreign state
unless that state decides to recognize and enforce it. Therefore, absent
international treaties or conventions, or in cases of immunity, a state
is free to determine for itself when its courts should have jurisdiction
without further limitations by international law.86
Others argue a judgment as a command by a public court needs to
obey limits of public international law just like orders by a sovereign's
legislative or executive branch. 87 International jurisdiction and
recognition of foreign judgments are two sides of the same coin. To
promote an effective international judicial system, foreign countries'
concerns need already be addressed at the jurisdictional level, rather
than the enforcement level. 88 One author compares international
83. See id. at 7-8 (referencing state court decisions).
84. See Strauss, supra note 37, at 407 (arguing that "it is precisely because
jurisdiction is intrinsically international that the paradigm requires it to be prescribed
by the international order, and that domestic courts should apply such international law
as authoritative in cases involving foreign plaintiffs or defendants").
85. See, e.g., SCHACK, supra note 61, at 87 (stating that international law does
not limit a state's freedom to adjudicate).
86. See Arthur Lenhoff, International Law and Rules on International
Jurisdiction, 50 CORNELL L. REV. 5, 7 (1964) (stating that besides international rules for
state immunity "there are at present no 'rules of international law specifically governing
the jurisdiction of a state to prescribe rules for the adjudication or other determination
of claims of a private nature"').
87. See F.A. MANN, THE DOCTRINE OF JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 111
RECUErL DES COURS 1, 73 (1964) (Neth.) (arguing that "[a] judgement, viz. a command
conveyed through the courts, is not essentially different from a command expressed by
legislative or administrative action"); see also Patzina, supra note 51, at 204 (stating that
international law sets positive and negative limits on state courts' jurisdiction).
88. See MANN, supra note 87, at 75 (arguing that international jurisdiction
"cannot be adequately discussed except in conjunction with the problem of the
recognition of foreign judgements, which, very largely, is identical with the problem of
the jurisdiction of foreign courts"); see also Strauss, supra note 37, at 416 (arguing that
applying international law of jurisdiction to international cases "should promote an
effective system of dispute resolution whereby opportunities for forum shopping will be
[VOL. 51:12431258
RECONCILING TRANSNA TIONAL JURISDICTION
jurisdiction to the use of force by one state against another, which is
clearly an issue of international law.8 9
While there may be many valid reasons for why international law
should govern personal jurisdiction, the content of such international
law is unclear. Some argue that customary international law does not
allow a country to claim jurisdiction over disputes that lack at least
some mimmum contact to the forum state.90 According to Restatement
Third of the Foreign Relations Law of the US (Restatement Third),
section 421: "[a] state may exercise jurisdiction through its courts to
adjudicate with respect to a person or thing if the relationship of the
state to the person or thing is such as to make the exercise of
jurisdiction reasonable." Reporters' Note 1 goes on to explain:
[tihe modern concepts of jurisdiction to adjudicate under international law are
similar to those developed under the due process clause of the United States
Constitution . .. The standards here set forth are comparable also to the criteria
set out in Order 11 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom
(1983) and to the standards applicable among EEC domiciliaries set forth in the
1968 European Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters, as amended in 1978 ... 91
In light of the minor role that the due process principle plays in
many foreign jurisdictions, this note seems to represent a US rather
than universal perspective; additionally, the reference to the 1968
Convention is misguided.92
The uncertainty about the content and even the existence of such
generally accepted international jurisdiction rules turns the role of
international law as a source of law for personal jurisdiction into a
rather theoretical question. This could explain why it is rarely
addressed in scholarship and practice. However, to acknowledge that
jurisdiction over foreign defendants is inherently international and
therefore, at least from a normative perspective, subject to delineations
under international law, is important despite the indeterminacy of its
content. First, customary international rules may emerge over time as
courts both in the United States and internationally continue to
consider foreign personal jurisdiction rules to a greater extent than in
minimized, foreign judgements will be satisfied, and jurisdictional conflicts will be
avoided").
89. See Strauss, supra note 37, at 407 (noting "doctrine-makers clearly accept
that the law governing the use of force by one state against another state is intrinsically
a question of interstate relations that, under the paradigm, can only be prescribed by the
international order" and "[t]here is no reason why that should be any less the case when
it comes to jurisdiction").
90. See Patzina, supra note 51, at 204 (noting that customary law does not
prescribe what these minimum contacts are due to a lack of continuous international
practice).
91. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 73, § 421 n.1.
92. See infra Part IV.A.1 & 2.
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the past.9 3 Second, while international customary rules currently may
not exist, the realization that personal jurisdiction is an issue best
solved through international law underscores the need for an
international agreement. 94 As jurisdiction ultimately involves
questions of recognition of judgments, internationally agreed-upon
norms are better suited to render international dispute resolution more
effective than countries continuing to develop rules in isolation.9 5 Still,
regardless of the benefits of internationally agreed-upon norms, as the
following Parts will show, deeply rooted differences between the US's
and other countries' jurisdiction rules have impeded treaty
negotiations in the past and continue to persist despite increased
consideration of international rapport by the U.S. Supreme Court.
III. PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN THE UNITED STATES
Since the United States is not party to any international
agreement on jurisdiction, international jurisdiction in the United
States is a matter of domestic law.96 This Part outlines the current US
rules and underlying characteristics.
A. US Sources
In the United States, no specific rules to determine jurisdiction
over foreign defendants exist. By default, courts apply identical rules
to determine personal jurisdiction over domestic and foreign
defendants.9 7 Though application of those rules may lead to different
results when foreign parties are involved, under current US law the
legal sources are the same for international and domestic cases.9
8
Against common misconception, the U.S. Supreme Court does not
make jurisdictional rules, but only identifies the limits to those rules
stemming from the U.S. Constitution.9 9 As such, jurisdiction is a
93. See supra text accompanying note 73.
94. See Strauss, supra note 37, at 423 (explaining why the treaty approach should
be followed).
95. See id. at 416 (arguing that applying international law of jurisdiction to
international cases "should promote an effective system of dispute resolution whereby
opportunities for forum shopping will be minimized, foreign judgements will be satisfied,
and jurisdictional conflicts will be avoided.")
96. See id. at 376-77 (stating that the United States is party to neither a bilateral
nor regional agreement).
97. See generally RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 73, § 421 n.1 ("[t]he modern
concepts of jurisdiction to adjudicate under international law are similar to those
developed under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution").
98. See supra Part IIB; see also Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Adjudicatory
Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared and Evaluated, 63 B.U. L. REV. 279, 282 (1985)
(pointing towards the effect the international character of a case may have on specific
rules and results).
99. See Michaels, supra note 8, at 1018.
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matter of state law, either in common law or statutory law, such as a
state's long-arm statutes, the reach of which varies considerably from
state to state. 100 However, because of the broad jurisdiction rules
under most state laws, limitations to jurisdiction de facto have mostly
become a matter of constitutional law.101
B. Characteristics
US personal jurisdiction rules have been the subject of extensive
discussion.10 2 Rather than providing a historical overview or in-depth
analysis of case law, which has been expertly done elsewhere,0 3 the
following subparts identify distinctive elements of US personal
jurisdiction rules in order to enable comparison with EU law and to
draw normative conclusions later in this Article.
1. Procedural Due Process and Minimum Contacts
The Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments of the United States
Constitution require that prior to a deprivation of life, liberty, or
property, due process of law must be given.104 Any rule relating to
jurisdiction in the United States must adhere to this constitutional
requirement; that due process be given to all parties in a suit is perhaps
the most widely debated aspect of personal jurisdiction in the United
States.0 5 Shortly after the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment,
100. See id. at 1019 (pointing towards the detailed rules of New York versus broad
general jurisdiction solely limited by the Constitution under California law); see also
Sachs, supra note 41, at 1252 (stating that "[a]s general law, jurisdiction is something
on which different court systems can disagree").
101. Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 119, 122 (2001) [hereinafter Borchers General Jurisdiction] (calling state laws'
personal jurisdiction rules "notoriously indeterminate" and noting that even New York,
despite its more restrictive long arm statute "allows a common law basis of general
jurisdiction over defendants who are 'doing business' in New York"); see also Michaels,
supra note 8, at 1021 (noting that in the United States the U.S. Supreme Court's case
law provides a detailed system ofjurisdictional rules, but that this was not the case until
the Court's landmark decision in Pennoyer).
102. See generally Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction's Noble Lie, 61 STAN. L. REV.
971 (2009); Borchers General Jurisdiction, supra note 101, at 122; Lea Brilmayer et al.,
A General Look at General Jusrisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721 (1988); Arthur T. von
Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79
HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966); Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson,
Toward a New Equilibrium in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207 (2014);
Sachs, supra note 41; Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 610 (1988).
103. See generally Vitiello, supra note 8.
104. See U.S. CONST. amend. X, XIV, § 1.
105. See Borchers General Jurisdiction, supra note 101, at 121 (calling the
constitutionalization of personal jurisdiction in the United States "an unfortunate
mistake"); see also Feldman, supra note 17, at 2199 (arguing that the
"constitutionalization" of personal jurisdiction is the biggest difference between US and
EU jurisdiction law and "restricts the American's ability to 'treatify' it").
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the Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. Neff (Pennoyer)106 held that, to
comply with due process requirements, a court's jurisdiction over
persons could reach "no farther than the geographic bounds of its
forum." 107 Pennoyer remained the dominant holding of law on a
tribunal's right to exercise jurisdiction over out-of-state as well as
foreign defendants for over fifty years. However, its strict approach
requiring territorial limitations did not fit in the evolving economic
interconnectedness that paid no heed to state, much less international,
territorial demarcations.1 0 8 In response to the new economic order, in
1945, the Supreme Court partially overturned the precedent set in
Pennoyer in its decision in International Shoe.
International Shoe set the framework for courts to determine, in
deciding if personal jurisdiction was present, "the relationship among
the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, rather than the mutually
exclusive sovereignty of the States," as Pennoyer had required.10 9 It is
in lnternational Shoe that the "minimum contacts" standard was
hardened into a controlling rule. Following International Shoe, a court
could exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant if
the defendant had certain minimum contacts with the forum "such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice"' 11 0-a criterion that has been heavily
criticized for its indeterminacy by international commentators ever
since."x1 The focus thus shifted from limitations of states' power by
their territorial borders for purposes of sovereignty to fairness to the
defendant.112
A decade later, in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.
(McGee),113 the Court further expanded "the permissible scope of state
jurisdiction" over out-of-state corporations. 114 With growing
nationwide commerce further expanded by the ease of transportation,
it seemed less and less burdensome to require a nonresident to stand
trial in a different state than his or her home state.u5 Accordingly, as
long as the out-of-state defendant had been given adequate notice and
106. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878).
107. Daimler A.G. v. Bauman, 571 U.S 117, 125 (2014).
108. See Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Marin, 495 U.S. 604, 617
(1990) (citing "changes in the technology of transportation and communication, and the
tremendous growth of interstate business activity" as why Pennoyer fell out-of-date).
109. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
110. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
111. See, e.g., SCHACK, supra note 61, at 181 (arguing that such meaningless rules
benefit no one, but only contribute to raising litigation costs).
112. See Vitiello, supra note 8, at 215 ("In the mid-twentieth century, International
Shoe Co. v. Washington reformulated the jurisdictional touchstone from a state's power
over those present within its territory to an analysis of the fairness or reasonableness of
an exercise of jurisdiction premised on the defendant's forum contacts.").
113. See generally McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
114. Id. at 223.
115. Id. at 222-23.
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an opportunity to be heard, the defendant's right to due process did not
limit a court's jurisdiction.1 1 6 This emphasis on procedural due process
became a distinctive feature of US personal jurisdiction rules. 117
Though the Supreme Court abandoned its overly broad approach in
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson (World-Wide),s1 8 procedural
due process requirements continue to exist in US law, such as in the
form of service of process jurisdiction, which is alien to and heavily
criticized in European civil law jurisdictions.1 19
2. Purposeful Availment, Fairness to the Defendant, and Predictability
Subsequently, the Supreme Court restricted unlimited personal
jurisdiction and notions such as fairness to the defendant and
predictability became more prominent. The Court's decision in World-
Wide is considered the first "retrenchment" on quasi-unlimited
personal jurisdiction A la McGee and its progeny.12 0 Here, the Supreme
Court rejected the idea that state courts' personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident was merely restricted by the undue burden a distant
forum would place on the defendant, 121 and set the stage for further
limitations, first in Asahi, then, thirty years later, in McIntyre and
Walden v. Fiore (Walden).122
The Court in World- Wide significantly limited personal
jurisdiction over nonresidents by requiring that a corporation
"purposefully availf] itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State," thus rejecting the "stream of commerce"
116. Although after its decision in McGee the Court tried to limit specific
jurisdiction in Hanson, lower courts and the Court's own subsequent rulings frequently
ignored this decision for various reasons. See Vitiello, supra note 8, at 221-22.
117. See Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More
Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 113 n.9 (1978)
("In its procedural aspect, due process has typically been viewed as setting the
conditions, if any, which must attach to deprivatory governmental action. When
operative, these conditions have normally been defined in terms of a requirement of some
sort of notice and opportunity to be heard prior to adverse governmental action.").
118. See generally World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)
[hereinafter World- Wide].
119. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (stating that the service of summons is enough
to establish jurisdiction over a defendant "subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general
jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located"); see also infra text
accompanying note 180.
120. Vitiello, supra note 8, at 227.
121. World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 294 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254
(1958)) ("Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being
forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a
strong interest in applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum State is the most
convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of
interstate federalism, may sometimes act o divest the State of its power to render a
valid judgement.").
122. See generally Vitiello, supra note 8 (tracing the development of Supreme
Court precedent from Pennoyer through the 2014 decisions).
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theory then in use by some lower courts.12 3 Lower courts and (foreign)
defendants struggled to apply the Supreme Court's holding in World-
Wide due to the uncertainty created by the contours of the "purposeful
availment" criteria. 124 The Court added to the general confusion by
indicating that "minimum contacts" were less "minimal" than
previously thought and that fairness to the defendant, rather than
state sovereignty or fairness for all parties, was at the center of
personal jurisdiction rules.12 5 Simply put, the defendant's interest in
predictability trumped the forum state's interest in the power to
adjudicate as well as convenience for the plaintiff.126
Such concern for fairness to the defendant was further expanded
in McIntyre, a product liability suit from New Jersey. The Supreme
Court of New Jersey, relying on the Supreme Court's holding in Asahi,
concluded that a British manufacturer could be party to an action in a
state court when that manufacturer knows or reasonably should know
that "its products are being distributed through a nationwide
distribution system" that might lead to those products being sold in
any of the fifty states.1 2 7 The Supreme Court, however, overturned,
determining that the "stream of commerce" doctrine used by the New
Jersey court was untenable as a personal jurisdiction test.128 In a
"badly splintered" and highly criticized opinion,129 the Court held that
in cases where the defendant does not enter the forum, "[t]he principal
inquiry ... is whether the defendant's activities manifest an intention
to submit to the power of a sovereign."o3 0 The foreign business can do
so "by sending goods rather than its agents."13 1 The Court stated the
123. World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 297 (stating "the foreseeability that is critical to due
process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum
State"); see also Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U.S.
102, 112 ("[tlhe 'substantial connection' between the defendant and the forum State
necessary for a finding of minimum contacts must come about by an action of the
defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State"). But see id. at 117 (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (arguing that placing a product into
the "stream of commerce" was sufficient to establish jurisdiction "[als long as a
participant in this process is aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum
State").
124. See Vitiello, supra note 8, at 232-35 (describing the Court's division in
subsequent rulings in Ashai and Burnham).
125. World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 297 ("The state for the foreseeability that is critical
to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the
forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum
State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.").
126. Id. ("The Due Process Clause, by ensuring the 'orderly administration of the
laws,' gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants
to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that
conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.").
127. Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 585 (N.J. 2010).
128. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2788.
129. Borchers, supra note 2, at 11.
130. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2788.
131. Id.
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defendant needs to "target the forum": as a general rule, it is not
enough that "the defendant might have predicted that its goods will
reach the forum State."l32
Three years later, in Walden,33 the Court deemed the place where
an intentional tort victim suffered injury irrelevant unless the
"defendant himself' had created the necessary contacts with the
forum.134
World- Wide, McIntyre, and Walden are specific jurisdiction cases:
the Supreme Court, since International Shoe, has distinguished
between specific and general jurisdiction. The first requires that the
in-state activities of the corporate defendant be "not only . . .
continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued
on."135 The second type of jurisdiction, general jurisdiction, is as its
name suggests: it is far broader and allows a plaintiff to sue a corporate
defendant even if the corporation's dealings are entirely separate from
the suit at hand.136 The strict limitations on specific jurisdiction in
McIntyre resulted in plaintiffs increasingly pursuing cases based on
general jurisdiction.1 3 7 Thus, it came as no surprise that the Supreme
Court, in its next chapter of cases relating to personal jurisdiction, such
as Goodyear and Daimler, dealt with issues regarding the scope of
general jurisdiction, curtailing it as well in the interest of fairness to
the defendant.'3 8
The Supreme Court in Goodyear sought to resolve uncertainty as
to whether personal jurisdiction could be exercised over a foreign
subsidiary through a domestic parent corporation whose activities in a
forum were entirely unrelated to the claims presented. There, a
defective tire manufactured by the Turkish Goodyear subsidiary
caused a bus accident outside Paris, France, which resulted in the
deaths of two North Carolina boys.'3 9 The parents brought suit against
the parent company Goodyear USA, an Ohio corporation, and its
subsidiaries organized and operating in Turkey, France, and
Luxembourg.140 While the parent corporation did not contest the North
132. Id.
133. Walden v. Fiore et al., 571 U.S. 277, 277 (2014).
134. Id. at 284 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).
135. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
136. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 118 (2014) (holding that general
jurisdiction is present where "a foreign corporation's 'continuous corporate operations
within a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on
causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities"').
137. See generally Twitchell, supra note 102, at 610, 628 (noting that specific
jurisdiction historically was far more commonly pursued than general jurisdiction, which
used to play a reduced role in modern jurisdiction theory compared to its counterpart).
138. See Borchers, supra note 2, at 15 (explaining commentators have pointed out
that the coupling of restricted specific and general jurisdiction leads to an increased "risk
of arbitrarily denying to plaintiffs a U.S. forum").
139. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 918 (2011).
140. Id.
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Carolina court's finding of jurisdiction, as it operated plants and
regularly conducted business in the state, the subsidiaries contested
the finding. 141 In an attempt to limit general jurisdiction over
corporations to places analogous to a natural person's domicile,14 2 the
Supreme Court held that "[a] court may assert general jurisdiction over
foreign ... corporations to hear any and all claims against them when
their affiliations with the State are so 'continuous and systematic' as
to render them essentially at home in the forum State."14 3 This ruling
was further refined in Daimler.
In this case, probably the most publicized out of the recent
personal jurisdiction cases, at least from an international
perspective, 144 the plaintiffs sought to hold the German public
corporation Daimler AG vicariously liable for its Argentinian
subsidiary's actions during the Argentine "Dirty War" period before a
California state court. 145 Neither did the subsidiary's actions take
place in California nor were the plaintiffs California residents. 146
Instead, plaintiffs attempted to establish jurisdiction based on the
contacts of Daimler's indirect subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz USA
(MBUSA), in California. 147 Relying on its ruling in Goodyear, the
Supreme Court concluded that to be subject to general jurisdiction, not
only would the out-of-state defendant need to engage in continuous and
systematic activities in the forum state, but those activities would need
to be so substantial and of such a nature as "to render them essentially
at home in the forum State."14 8 The Court stated that for a corporation
to be considered "at home" in a jurisdiction, except for "exceptional
case[s]," 149 "the place of incorporation and the principal place of
buniue, mepaadini]-. . . bases for general jurisdiction."'150 Since
Daimler AG was neither incorporated nor had its principal place of
business in California, the Court concluded that California courts
lacked personal jurisdiction.
Daimler effectively limited international human rights abuse
victims' access to US courts, a main criticism of human rights
141. Id.
142. See id. at 924 ("[flor an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of
general jurisdiction is the individual's domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent
place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home"); see also Borchers,
supra note 2, at 12-13 (addressing some of the shortcomings of the "essential at home"
test).
143. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919.
144. See generally Reynolds & Zimmer, supra note 2; Zekoll & Schulz, supra note
2; Migliorini, supra note 2.
145. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 121 (2014).
146. Id. at 122.
147. Id. at 122-23.
148. Id. at 122.
149. Id. at 139 n.19.
150. Id. at 136.
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advocates and commentators, from the United States and abroad.1 51
However, the decision was well received by foreign businesses and
private international law scholars, because it finally put an end to the
perceived US "hegemony" in international jurisdiction and curbed US
jurisdiction from becoming the "Shangri-La of class-action litigation"
for plaintiffs from around the world.152
In Goodyear and Daimler, the Supreme Court arguably attempted
to adjust its due process standards as developed in International Shoe
and World- Wide to match an era in which corporations almost always
operate at a global scale, and territorial boundaries are increasingly
disappearing.15 3 Thus, the decisions are less revolutionary than some
may think.154 They rather merely translate the minimum contacts test
to new economic realities. In a volatile economic environment,
predictability becomes as-if not more-important as justice. 155
Uncertainty creates costs that companies need to hedge for-and many
do so through legal means.15 6 The growing use of predictive analytics
for legal purposes evidences this trend.'5 7 Hence, the Supreme Court's
rulings respond to companies' increased need for legal certainty.158
One could argue that International Shoe has "fallen out-of-date" as a
result of changed economic realities, just as Pennoyer had by 1945.159
In order for globally operating companies that are exposed to
lawsuits basically anywhere in the world to be able to "structure their
151. See generally Skinner, supra note 2.
152. See Morrison et al. v. National Australia Bank Ltd. et al., 561 U.S. 247, 270
(2010) ("some fear that [the United States] has become the Shangri-La of class-action
litigation for lawyers representing those allegedly cheated in foreign securities
markets"); see also Daimler, 571 U.S. at 142 (invoking "considerations of international
rapport"). See generally Mathias Reimann, Ruckzug der "Rechtsweltmacht'? Neo-
Territorialismus im US-Supreme Court, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR ROLF STIRNER ZUM 70.
GEBURTSTAG 1779 (2013) (Ger.).
153. On the difficulties of adapting personal jurisdiction rules to the Internet age,
see generally Alan M. Trammell & Derek E. Bambauer, Personal Jurisdiction and the
"Interwebs", 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1029 (2015). For recent attempts by the ECJ to adapt
tort jurisdiction under art. 7 (2) of the Brussel Regulation to cases of online violation of
personality rights, see Case C-194/16, Ingrid Ilsjan v. Svensk Handel AB, 2016/C 211/45.
154. See generally sources cited supra note 34 and accompanying text.
155. On the importance of predictability in the legal system see generally P. S.
Atiyah, Justice and Predictability in the Common Law, 15 U. NEW SOUTH WALES L.J.
448 (1992).
156. Ilan Benshalom, Rethinking International Distributive Justice: Fairness as
Insurance, 31 B.U. INT'L L.J. 267, 304 (2013) (pointing towards the impact of global
external shocks such as the food or financial crisis of 2008, which are largely out of
corporations' control).
157. See generally Predictive Justice: When Algorithms Pervade the Law, PARIS
INNOVATION REv. (June 9, 2017), http://parisinnovationreview.comlarticles-
en/predictive-justice-when-algorithms-pervade-the-law [https://perma.cc/C6G6-5HM3]
(archived Sept. 3, 2018).
158. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (quoting Hertz Corp. v.
Friend, 559 U. S. 77, 94 (2010)) ("[s]imple jurisdictional rules . . . promote greater
predictability.").
159. See supra text accompanying note 108.
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primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that
conduct will and will not render them liable to suit," the Supreme
Court in Daimler introduced a comparative contacts analysis.16
0 The
analysis would require a court, in determining if a corporation was "at
home" in the forum state, to review a corporation's contacts as a whole,
and determine the proportion of those contacts with the forum state.1
6 '
It thus follows that the larger the corporation and the more extensive
its contacts, the fewer forums exist where jurisdiction is present.1
62
Not only does the test one-sidedly favor large corporations,1
63 it
also is somewhat counterproductive. By requiring a comparative
analysis at the jurisdiction stage, the Court asks for a substantial
analysis, including pre-trial discovery at a very early stage in the
process. 164 It is questionable if the new rules are successful in
achieving their goal of making jurisdiction more predictable or whether
alternative solutions would be better suited to adapt jurisdictional
rules to today's global economic environment including balancing the
interests of plaintiffs, defendants, and sovereign states.1
65
3. Territoriality, Federalism, and Authority
Despite the Supreme Court's recent focus on defendant interests,
the power relationship between the defendant and the court remains a
distinctive feature of US jurisdiction rules and is reflected in recent
Court decisions in the requirement of a direct connection between the
defendant and the forum. Hence, such decisions could evidence a
revival of territoriality A la Pennoyer ather than a "major change" in
the Supreme Court's approach to personal jurisdiction.1
66 How did we
get here?
In Pennoyer, the Court reasoned that a tribunal, in attempting to
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over a person or property, would
violate the principle that "every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction
160. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139; see also id. at 149 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(noting that the Court prior to Daimler never focused on "the relative magnitude of
[defendant's] contacts in comparison to the defendant's contacts with other States").
161. See id. n.20 ("General jurisdiction instead calls for an appraisal of a
corporation's activities in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide. A corporation that
operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them. Otherwise, 'at
home' would be synonymous with "doing business" tests framed before specific
jurisdiction evolved in the United States.").
162. See BNSF Ry. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1560 (2017) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting in part); Daimler, 571 U.S. at 157 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
163. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 157 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (criticizing the test
for "treat[ing] small businesses unfairly").
164. See id. at 153-56; see also infra Part III.C.3.
165. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 156-59; see also infra Part III.C.3.
166. See Robertson & Rhodes, supra note 2, at 782 (calling the Supreme Court's




and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory."167 At
the time, personal jurisdiction mainly was a question of a court's power
over a defendant,16 8 and the emphasis was on limiting jurisdiction to a
state's territory in the interest of reciprocating sister states' right to
sovereignty.1 69 In International Shoe, the focus pivoted to due process
and the undue burden a distant forum would place on the defendant.17 0
Finally, in World-Wide, the Court stated "that due process
limitations on personal jurisdiction reflect both the right of the
defendant to a fair proceeding and territorial limitations on state
power." 171 The Court advanced federalism, meaning territorial
limitations on state sovereignty due to a sister state's interest in the
case, to justify "that a state may assert jurisdiction only over
nonresidents who have liability-related contacts with state territory,"
even if asserting jurisdiction over them would put no undue burden on
them.172 The Court's use of the Due Process Clause "as an instrument
of interstate federalism" has been criticized as theoretically flawed.173
However, the fact that the Court bases jurisdictional limitations on
federalism and not due process alone explains why it has been so
reluctant to use only foreseeability as a criterion for personal
jurisdiction.174
Federalism and its inherent vertical power relationship between
the court and the defendant also provides an explanation as to why
fairness in litigation between the plaintiff and the defendant is
relatively unimportant to the Supreme Court.175 In McIntyre the Court
conceded "[t]here may be exceptions" to the rule that a defendant needs
to purposefully avail itself of the forum state-for example, in
167. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877).
168. See Michaels, supra note 8, at 1030 ("The power theory focuses on the power
relation between court and defendant, both in its actual and its hypothetical form.").
169. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722 (stating "[t]he several States are of equal dignity
and authority, and the independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all
others").
170. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017)
(holding that the "primary concern" is "the burden on the defendant"); see also supra
Part III.B.
171. Arthur M. Weisburd, Territorial Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 63
WASH. U. L.Q. 377, 377 (1985).
172. See id. at 379-80.
173. See Vitiello, supra note 8, at 214, 230 (criticizing the Court's "underlying
theory-that the Fourteenth Amendment protected one 'sovereign' state's power from
overreaching by another state-[as] analytically jarring"). See generally Stephen
Goldstein, Federalism and Substantive Due Process: A Comparative and Historical
Perspective on International Shoe and Its Progeny, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 965 (1995).
174. See Weisburd, supra note 171, at 379 ("A simple reference to the efficient
functioning of the institution whose authority is in issue cannot answer questions of the
limits of authority, unless efficiency is demonstrated to be a source of authority for that
institution.").
175. See Michaels, supra note 8, at 1030-31 (arguing the vertical relationship
explains why the Supreme Court considers whether asserting jurisdiction in a particular
forum is fair to the defendant rather than the plaintiff).
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intentional tort cases. 176 However, invoking "judicial power," it
ultimately concluded, "it is the defendant's actions, not his
expectations, that empower a State's courts to subject him to
judgment."77
Arguments for restricting a court's jurisdiction over a foreign
defendant in line with the theory of federalism also serve to justify
looking exclusively at the defendant's relationship with the particular
forum state, not other states or the United States as a whole.1 78 The
Supreme Court in McIntyre reasoned accordingly: "[I]f another State
were to assert jurisdiction in an inappropriate case, it would upset the
federal balance, which posits that each State has a sovereignty that is
not subject to unlawful intrusion by other States," thus rebuking the
aggregate contacts test.1 79
Finally, federalism and its inherent power relationship between a
court and a defendant explains why the Supreme Court, contrary to
European jurisdictions (including the UK common law system)
continues to allow jurisdiction established on service of process.8 0
Arguably not fair to the foreign defendant, service of process
jurisdiction is based on "authority" alone, 181 and is thus highly
criticized by foreign and domestic commentators alike as a means of
exorbitant jurisdiction.182
176. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 877-88 (2011).
177. See id. at 883; see also Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct.
1773, 1780 (2017) ("As we have put it, restrictions on personal jurisdiction'are more than
a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence
of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States."').
178. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 884 ("personal jurisdiction requires a forum-by-forum,
or sovereign-by-sovereign, analysis"); see also Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 930-31 (2011) ("Neither below nor in their brief in opposition to
the petition for certiorari did respondents urge disregard of petitioners' discrete status
as subsidiaries and treatment of all Goodyear entities as a 'unitary business,' so that
jurisdiction over the parent would draw in the subsidiaries as well. Respondents have
therefore forfeited this contention, and we do not address it."). But see Goodyear, 564
U.S. at 930 (noting "[riespondents belatedly assert a 'single enterprise' theory, asking us
to consolidate petitioners' ties to North Carolina with those of Goodyear USA and other
Goodyear entities," but ultimately this was not decided by the Court).
179. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 884.
180. See Borchers General Jurisdiction, supra note 101, at 123 ('To Europeans,..
transient jurisdiction no longer comports with contemporary standards of due process
(or its equivalent) and therefore had to be abandoned in English and Irish practice.").
181. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 883 ("The conclusion that jurisdiction is in the first
instance a question of authority rather than fairness explains, for example, why the
principal opinion in Burnham 'conducted no independent inquiry into the desirability or
fairness' of the rule that service of process within a State suffices to establish jurisdiction
over an otherwise foreign defendant.").
182. See Stilrner, supra note 6, at 20 (critiquing service of process in airplane while
in US territory); see also Borchers General Jurisdiction, supra note 101, at 123 n.27
(calling it "notoriously unfair" and "noting that tag jurisdiction subjects travelers to
sham suits, courts in jurisdictions with no connection with the facts of the case, and the
prospect of defending in a place where he has no familiarity"). See generally Tanya J.
Monestier, Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and the Fallacy of Consent, 36
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C. Recent Developments
The aforementioned principles influenced the Supreme Court's
most recent line of cases regarding jurisdiction over out-of-state
corporate defendants.
1. BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
Superior Court
In BNSF, two nonresidents and employees of BNSF brought a suit
in a Montana state court against the petitioner for injuries sustained
outside of the state.18 3 The Montana Supreme Court held that it could
exercise general jurisdiction because, under state law, personal
jurisdiction could be asserted over "persons found within . . .
Montana," 184 contending that, while BNSF was incorporated in
Delaware with its principal place of business in Texas, it had:
2,061 miles of railway tracks in Montana (about 6% of its total track mileage of
32,500), employs some 2,100 workers there (less than 5% of its total work force
of 43,000), generates less than 10% of its total revenue in the State, and
maintains one of its 24 automotive facilities in Montana (4%).185
Further, pursuant to § 56 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act
(FELA), the state supreme court concluded, a state court could exercise
personal jurisdiction over any federal businesses, including railroads,
"doing business" in the state.186 As BNSF was both "found" and "doing
business" within the state of Montana, the state courts could exercise
personal jurisdiction over the corporation.
The Supreme Court rejected this holding, finding that § 56 of
FELA confers venue jurisdiction in its first relevant section and
subject-matter jurisdiction in the second.187 The Court went on to hold
that the lower court's decision to allocate personal jurisdiction over an
out-of-state defendant did not comply with the limitations imposed by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, nor with the
Supreme Court's previous holdings.18 8 Because the injury did not occur
CARDOZO L. REV. 1343 (2015) (discussing the broadening of a court's jurisdiction through
the mandatory appointment of an agent for service of process when a business registers
under state law).
183. BNSF Ry. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1553 (2017).
184. Id. at 1554 (citing MONT. R. CIV. P. 4(b)(1) (2015)).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1555; see also Iselin v. La Coste, 147 F.2d 791, 795 (5th Cir. 1945)
("Jurisdiction is the power to adjudicate and is granted by Congress. Litigants may not
confer this power on the court by waiver or consent, but the place where the power to
adjudicate is to be exercised is venue, not jurisdiction. The venue has relation to the
convenience of the litigants and may be waived or laid by consent of the parties.").
188. BNSF, 137 S. Ct. at 1558-59.
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in Montana, nor in relation to any continuous contacts that BNSF had
with Montana, nor was it in any way related to Montana, specific
jurisdiction was not at issue.1 89 In the matter of general jurisdiction,
the Court relied on Daimler, holding that BNSF's contacts were in no
way substantial enough to form an "exceptional case," nor were they
"of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State."
19 0
The Montana Supreme Court did not correctly identify the contacts
that BNSF had within Montana; one may not focus "solely on the
magnitude of the defendant's in-state contacts,"1'9 but instead must
"apprais[e] . . . a corporation's activities in their entirety, nationwide
and worldwide," as "[a] corporation that operates in many places can
scarcely be deemed at home in all of them."192 This-against all
criticism 193 -- confirmed the "comparative contacts" analysis first
discussed in Daimler,194 and the Supreme Court's attempt to limit
general jurisdiction over corporations to a limited number of places.s
9 5
Most recently, the Supreme Court was faced with the question in
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. as to whether California state law regarding
the authority of a state court to hail an out-of-state defendant hrough
specific jurisdiction was compatible with the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 196 In that case, the defendant was
pharmaceutical giant Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS), incorporated in
Delaware with substantial operations in both New Jersey as well as
New York, where its headquarters was located.19 7 The extent of BMS's
contacts with the state of California included: five research and
laboratory facilities staffed with around 160 employees, approximately
250 sales representatives, "a small-scale state government advocacy
office in Sacramerto," -and the aggregate sale of nearly 187 million
Plavix pills worth more than $900 million. 198 The plaintiffs
represented 678 patients prescribed Plavix, of which eighty-six were
California residents.'9 9 The California Supreme Court unanimously
found general jurisdiction lacking but was split on the finding of
specific jurisdiction.20 0 "The majority applied a 'sliding scale approach
to specific jurisdiction,"' concluding that "the more wide-ranging the
189. Id. at 1559.
190. Id. at 1558.
191. Id. at 1559 (concluding "[o]therwise, 'at home' would be synonymous with
'doing business' tests").
192. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 n.20 (2014).
193. BNSF, 137 S. Ct. at 1560-62 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
194. See sources cited supra note 160 and accompanying text.
195. See sources cited supra note 142 and accompanying text.
196. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1779 (2017).
197. Id. at 1777-78.





defendant's forum contacts, the more readily is shown a connection
between the forum contacts and the claim."2o'
The Supreme Court, however, reversed: "[i]n order for a state
court to exercise specific jurisdiction, 'the suit' must 'aris[e] out of or
relat[e] to the defendant's contacts with the forum."'20 2 The fact that
other plaintiffs, who resided in California, "sustained the same injuries
as did the nonresidents . . . does not allow the State [of California] to
assert specific jurisdiction over the nonresidents' claims." 203 The
California "sliding scale approach" lacked precedent, as the
defendant's unconnected activities (sales, laboratories, etc.), even if
extensive, had never before been enough for specific jurisdiction to
stick.204 Finding that there was no direct link between the state and
the nonresidents' claims, the Court concluded that specific jurisdiction
did not exist.20 5
In BNSF the Supreme Court squarely applied its precedent set
forth in Goodyear, McIntyre, Walden, and Daimler. Bristol-Myers was
a more challenging case and has already spurred considerable
debate.206 That the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide two
additional personal jurisdiction cases shortly after issuing its
controversial 2011 and 2014 decisions could indicate that the Court
was determined to end the decade-old debate over personal
jurisdiction. If such were true, however, the two new cases contribute
little in the way of clarifying its d. ctrine.207 Contrary to Daimler,
McIntyre, and Goodyear, both BNSF and Bristol-Myers involved
domestic parties, signaling that the Supreme Court continues to apply
identical rules to domestic and international cases and that the limited
jurisdiction rules, which it developed in its previous decisions, were in
no way meant to apply exclusively in international cases.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1780.
203. Id. at 1781.
204. Id. See also Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915,
919 (2011) (explaining for a court to exercise specific jurisdiction over a claim, there must
be an 'affiliatio[n] between the forum and the underlying controversy,' principally, [an]
activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State"). When there is no such
connection, specific jurisdiction is lacking regardless of the extent of a defendant's
unconnected activities in the State. See id. at 930 n.6 ("[E]ven regularly occurring sales
of a product in a State do not justify the exercise of jurisdiction over a claim unrelated to
those sales.").
205. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1779 ("The mere fact that other plaintiffs were
prescribed, obtained, and ingested Plavix in California-and allegedly sustained the
same injuries as did the nonresidents-does not allow the State to assert specific
jurisdiction over the nonresidents' claims ... [A] defendant's relationship with a ... third
party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction.").
206. See generally Bradt & Rave, supra note 31.
207. See id. at 1254 (arguing Bristol-Myers in fact "had little to do with the
traditional concerns underlying limitations on personal jurisdiction" but is better
understood as part of "the chess match going on in mass-torts . . .").
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2. Parent-Subsidiary Corporate Structures
The Supreme Court, prior to Daimler, had not had the opportunity
to address whether a foreign corporation could be subjected to a state's
general jurisdiction based solely on the contacts of one of its
subsidiaries.2 0 8
On the matter, the Ninth Circuit rejected Daimler's argument
that such contacts should only be assigned to a parent corporation
when the parent dominates its subsidiary such that the latter may only
be described as the former's alter ego.2 09 Instead, the circuit adopted a
less rigorous test, allowing such contacts to be assigned in instances of
the existence of an agency relationship.2 1 0 While agency relationships
had been, in the past, relevant to a query of specific jurisdiction,
211
they had not been found as the basis of general jurisdiction, as agents
may have complete authority in certain business aspects, but that
"does not make him or her an agent for every [business] purpose."2 12
The Ninth Circuit relied on the observation that the subsidiary,
MBUSA, had conducted important services, concluding that Daimler
would be hypothetically ready to perform those services itself should
MBUSA not exist.2 1 3 However, such a holding would allow for too
broad an extension of jurisdiction, allowing courts to exert jurisdiction
for "[a]nything a corporation does through an independent contractor,
subsidiary, or distributor," as it would be "presumably something that
the corporation would do 'by other means' if the independent
contractor, subsidiary, or distributor did not exist."214
The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's agency approach
to establishing general jurisdiction, calling it far too broad, as it would
"subject foreign corporations to general jurisdiction whenever they
have an in-state subsidiary or affiliate, an outcome that would sweep
beyond even the 'sprawling view of general jurisdiction' . . . rejected in
Goodyear." 215 To assign MBUSA's California contacts to Daimler
would also assign MBUSA's similar contacts in every other state with
sizeable sales, undercutting the long-held principle that an out-of-state
defendant, to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, should be provided some minimum assurances as to
208. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 134 (2014). The Court in International
Shoe had addressed derivative jurisdiction-jurisdiction based on the contacts of a third
party-in a specific jurisdiction case. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318
(1945) (holding that "the commission of some single or occasional acts of the corporate
agent in a state . . . may be deemed sufficient to render the corporation liable to suit').
209. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 135.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 136 n.13.
212. Id. at 135.
213. Id. at 135-36.




where it is and is not liable for suit.2 16 The Court did not rule on
whether such a relationship could be used in assigning the contacts of
a subsidiary to a parent for the establishment of specific jurisdiction.2 17
Some lower courts, such as the Fifth Circuit, have used agency theory
to establish specific jurisdiction over foreign parent corporations.218
The Court has, in the past, used dicta as the basis for future
rulings, and a potential approach to the issue of assigning contacts
from a subsidiary to a parent might be found in the opinion on Bristol-
Myers Squibb. In that case, respondents attempted to assign personal
jurisdiction to BMS through its contracting with a California company,
McKesson.219 But the Court rejected this approach, stating that "[t]he
requirements of International Shoe must be met as to each defendant
over whom a state court exercises jurisdiction."2 20 "[A] defendant's
relationship with a . . . third party, standing alone, is an insufficient
basis for jurisdiction."221 While the Court was not presented with a
question as to whether BMS engaged in relevant acts with McKesson,
nor whether BMS was derivatively liable for McKesson's conduct,
prevailing law remains that a defendant must purposefully avail itself
of a forum, and cannot be "haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of
'random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated' contacts"222 or the "unilateral
activity of another party or third person."2 23 Against this background,
it remains uncertain if, in the future, the Court will allow the actions
of a third party, including a subsidiary not completely dominated by its
out-of-state parent corporation, to be transposed to the defendant who
has not purposefully availed itself of that forum.
3. Public Policy Concerns
Justice Sotomayor raised compelling points on public policy in her
various separate opinions to the majority's opinions. This Part outlines
216. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) ("The Due Process
Clause . . . gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential
defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to
where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.").
217. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 135 n.13 (2014).
218. See Celgard, LLC v. SK Innovation Co., Ltd., 792 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (holding "[iun order to establish jurisdiction under agency theory, the plaintiff must
show that the defendant exercises control over the activities of the third-party"); In re
Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., 753 F.3d 521, 531 (5th Cir. 2014)
(holding that "Daimler therefore embraces the significance of a principal-agent
relationship to the specific-jurisdiction analysis, though it suggests that an agency
relationship alone may not be dispositive," before looking to five factors to determine if
agency could be assigned).
219. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783 (2017).
220. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980).
221. Id.; see also Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 286 (2014).
222. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980)).
223. Id.
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her concerns as expressed in Daimler, BNSF, and finally Bristol-
Myers.
Starting with Daimler, Justice Sotomayor raised an issue with the
majority's "comparative contacts" analysis. 224 Justice Sotomayor
agreed that the Due Process Clause restricted the suit being brought
in California, but not because of insufficient contacts; rather, "the case
involve [d] foreign plaintiffs suing a foreign defendant based on foreign
conduct, and . .. a more appropriate forum [was] available."225 First,
Justice Sotomayor predicted that the majority's approach will lead to
unwieldy and unnecessary discovery to determine if jurisdiction exists,
as a court will need to look past the corporation's contacts with the
forum state alone and take into account the business activities the
corporation engages in worldwide, and then compare.22 6 In a world
where it is "increasingly common [that] a corporation 'divides its
command and coordinating functions among officers who work at
several different locations,"'22 7 the majority's approach, she concluded,
will limit a "State['s] sovereign authority to adjudicate disputes against
corporate defendants who have engaged in continuous and substantial
business operations within their boundaries," and that the majority's
approach will result in "the State . . . los[ing] that power."2 28
Next, Justice Sotomayor warned that the majority's comparative
contacts analysis will lead to an undue burden on small businesses in
comparison with multinational corporations.229 A small business that
targets principally one state that amounts to a fraction of a large-scale
operation like Daimler would nevertheless be subject to suit in that
state on a claim resulting anywhere in the world.2 30 Comparatively,
Daimler, far more pervasive than its small competitor, might actually
have operations in those parts of the world, and yet a claim predicated
on general jurisdiction could not be brought in the California court
system, for example, because Daimler's contacts are so .widely
dispersed that they are not necessarily concentrated in California.
231
Perhaps most important, however, is Justice Sotomayor's issue
that, in protecting the due process rights of a business defendant, the
majority has taken away the rights of the individuals harmed by their
actions. 232 Under the new rules, as Daimler effectively illustrates,
plaintiffs could be deprived of the forum most favorable to them,
224. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 143 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (criticizing the majority for "deem[ing] Daimler 'too big for general
jurisdiction').
225. Id. at 143-44.
226. Id. at 153-54.
227. Id. at 157.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 158.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 158-59.
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especially since the Supreme Court has not only limited general but
also specific jurisdiction.233 Additionally, there is a similar cost to a
domestic, in-state business that might enter into a contract with an
out-of-state foreign corporation abroad; that business would be unable
to use the US court system to obtain relief for any breach, as no US
court would have jurisdiction over that corporation.234
In her dissent in BNSF, Justice Sotomayor called the ruling a
"jurisdictional windfall" for large multistate or multinational
corporations, and said that "individual plaintiffs, harmed by the
actions of a farflung [sic] corporation . . . will bear the brunt of the
majority's approach and be forced to sue in distant jurisdictions with
which they have no contacts or connection."2 35 In her criticism of the
majority's comparative contacts analysis, she opined that a corporation
that becomes large enough, with widely enough dispersed contacts,
would never be subject to suit in any jurisdiction other than its place
of incorporation or principal places of business, as it would have no
particular forum where its contacts were more substantial than in
another even if, standing on their own, those contacts would be enough
for general jurisdiction to be found.23 6 Justice Sotomayor extended a
strong public policy argument in favor of the injured plaintiffs; a far-
flung corporation that does harm in a particular jurisdiction would be
granted due process rights at the expense of the injured party, who
would have to bear the burden of bringing a suit in an unfamiliar and
distant jurisdiction.2 3 7 She claimed that the relative percentage of
contacts2 3 8 should be irrelevant; instead, the analysis should focus on
the quantity and quality of the contacts with the potential forum state
as they stand alone.239
In Bristol-Myers, the final case of the triad, Justice Sotomayor
fully dissented with the majority's approach to determine if specific
jurisdiction were present.240 In her dissent, she reminded us of settled
principles of personal jurisdiction law she found the majority
233. Id.; see also sources cited supra note 138 and accompanying text. Human
rights-related cases such as Daimler or Kiobel have forcefully illustrated that the United
States, in the past, sometimes was the only forum where victims effectively could seek
relief. See generally Gwynne L. Skinner, Beyond Kiobel: Providing Access to Judicial
Remedies for Violations of International Human Rights Norms by Transnational
Business in A New (Post-Kiobel) World, 46 COLUM. HUM. RTS L. REV. 158 (2014)
(outlining the barriers human rights victims face in seeking access to justice in the
United States and abroad).
234. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 159 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
235. BNSF Ry. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1560-61 (2017) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting in part).
236. Id. at 1560.
237. Id. at 1560-61.
238. See, e.g., id. at 1554 (presenting Montana-specific contacts as a percentage of
the whole of BNSF's US operations).
239. Id. at 1561 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting in part).
240. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1784 (2017)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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disregarded in denying jurisdiction over BMS in the California
courts.241 Given MBS's extensive contacts in California, including
Plavix sales, which "account[ed] for a significant portion of its
revenue," she concluded that BMS "purposefully avail[ed] itself . .. of
California and its substantial pharmaceutical market."242 As to the
connection between the claim and the forum necessary to establish
specific jurisdiction, the California court could have had jurisdiction
even over the out-of-state plaintiffs, Justice Sotomayor opined, as their
claims could relate to the advertising efforts that took place in
California, which were identical to the advertising efforts that took
place in their home states.243 Lastly, Justice Sotomayor argued that
BMS would be more heavily burdened if it had to defend claims in each
of the separate forum states, rather than in a consolidated action in
one state, as is the case presently.244 The plaintiffs also benefit in a
consolidated action, which allows minimization of costs and
maximization of recoveries under one claim where, by contrast, the
individual claims standing alone might be too small to receive relief.
245
The public policy concerns raised by Justice Sotomayor could serve as
a future point of contention on the Court and suggest that the question
of personal jurisdiction over foreign corporate defendants before US
courts is far from being resolved.
IV. PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Many of the issues raised by Justice Sotomayor are potentially
solved, or at least addressed, in the European approach to jurisdiction
over foreign corporate defendants, but pursuant to European legal
traditions, these issues are addressed in different ways. The following
Part outlines personal jurisdiction rules in the European Union.
Further, it examines if these rules may provide alternative solutions
for some of the public policy concerns mentioned above and to what
extent they are compatible with current American jurisprudence.
A. European Sources
In the European Union, there are two distinct sets of sources for
determining personal jurisdiction, or, to use civil law terminology,
international competence. The Brussels Regulation (the Regulation),
part of the Brussels Regime, harmonizes rules on jurisdiction among
241. Id. at 1785-86.
242. Id. at 1786.
243. Id.




European Union member states in civil or commercial matters, 246
while the individual member states' domestic laws provide
jurisdictional rules for international cases outside of the sphere of
application of the Brussels Regime.247 Perhaps surprising to the US
observer, constitutional law plays a relatively insignificant role in
European jurisdiction law.24 8 Jurisdictional rules have been left to the
national and European legislators249 and have rarely been challenged
on constitutional grounds.2 50
1. The Brussels Regime
Unlike US law, the Brussels Regulation provides detailed, codified
rules for when a court in an EU member state is competent to judge a
case. The Brussels Regulation contains eighty-one articles and forty-
one recitals in its preamble, which explains the legislative intent
behind the Regulation.251 Articles 4 to 26 enumerate the applicable
jurisdiction rules in the European Union. These rules exhaustively
regulate jurisdiction within the European Union. Hence, the
246. See generally Brussels Regulation, supra note 39. As of January 10, 2015, the
Regulation replaced Council Regulation 44/2001, 2000 O.J. (L 012) (EC) [hereinafter
Brussels I Regulation], on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments
in civil and commercial matters. See Brussels Regulation, supra note 39, art. 66. In
addition to common jurisdictional rules, the Regulation provides that a judgment issued
in an EU member state shall be recognized in another member state without any special
recognition procedure. See id. art. 36, 1 1.
247. On the relationship between Brussels Regulation and third countries, see
infra pp. 1283-84 and accompanying footnotes.
248. Legal scholars have invoked constitutional law to invalidate the concept of
forum non conveniens, and exorbitant national jurisdiction rules, but not to define the
contours of general or specific personal jurisdiction. See Cohen, La Convention
europeenne des droit de lhomme et le droit international priod francais, 78 REV. CRIT.
D.I.P. 451, 454-63 (1989); Courbe, Note, 1996 D.S. JUR. 472, 473-74; Friedrich K.
Juenger, Constitutionalizing German Jurisdictional Law, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 521, 521-
22 (1996); Commentators disagree on the relevance of art. 6 (1) of the ECHR for
international jurisdiction rules. See Haimo Schack, Vermogensbelegenheit als
Zustandigkeitsgrund--Exorbitant oder sinnvoll?, § 23 ZPO in Rechtsoergleichender
Perspektive, 97 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR ZIVILPRoZESS 46, 60 (1984) (Ger.). Contra THOMAS
PFEIFFER, INTERNATIONALE ZUSTANDIGKEIT UND PROZESSUALE GERECHTIGKEIT 583-84
(1995).
249. The German Constitutional Court in National Iranian Oil Company explicitly
stated that it is for the legislator, not the Constitutional Court, to decide if the exorbitant
German jurisdiction rule in section 23 ZPO (jurisdiction based on defendant's assets in
the forum state) is too far reaching. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG]
[Constitutional Court] Apr. 12, 1983, 64 BVERFGE 1 (20) (Ger.).
250. See Juenger, supra note 248, at 525 (pointing towards a controversial decision
by the highest German Court in Civil matters (BGH) attempting to introduce a minimum
contacts requirement into sec. 23 of the ZPO).
251. See Tadas Klimas & Jurate Vaiciukaite, The Law of Recitals in European
Community Legislation, 15 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 15-16 (2008),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1159604 [https://perma.ccY28M-53V8] (archived Aug. 28,
2018) (discussing the effect of recitals according to the doctrine of the ECJ).
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Regulation replaces the member states' domestic rules;
25 2 it is for the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) to ensure consistent interpretation
throughout the Union.253
The Brussels Regulation applies whenever the defendant is
domiciled in a member state of the European Union, independent of
the defendant's nationality.254 This provision extends the Regulation's
sphere of application beyond intra-European cases. If, for example, a
US plaintiff sues a company incorporated or headquartered in the
European Union before a court in an EU member state, the Regulation
will determine if the court is competent to judge the case.
2 5 5 The
plaintiffs domicile or nationality is irrelevant. As an example, the
Regulation does not apply if a European plaintiff sues a US defendant
nowhere domiciled in the European Union before a domestic court in a
European member state.
Moreover, the Regulation's jurisdictional rules apply exclusively
to international cases.25 6 If a German sues another German before a
German court, national German jurisdiction rules will apply. In this
regard, contrary to existing rules in the United States, the European
regime clearly distinguishes between international and domestic
personal jurisdiction. The Brussels Regulation unifies jurisdictional
rules for international cases, but it does not (yet) create a uniform
European law of jurisdiction.
257
In addition to the Brussels Regulation, the so-called Lugano
Convention applies between the EU member states and those
European countries that re not members of the Union, such as
Switzerland, Norway, and Iceland. 258 The Lugano Convention has
mirrored past versions of the Brussels Regulation. Together, the
Brussels Regulation and the Lugano Convention have commonly been
252. EU regulations are directly binding without additional domestic legislation,
while EU directives require local legislation in each member state. See European Union,
Regulations, Directives and Other Acts, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.E.U./european-
union/law/legal-acts-en (last visited Feb. 21, 2017) [https://perma.cclF47G-HVNN]
(archived Aug. 25, 2018).
253. See Giulio Itzcovich, The Interpretation of Community Law by the European
Court of Justice, 10 GER. L.J. 537, 545 (2009) (explaining the preliminary ruling
procedure in EU law and the ECJ's role in ensuring that EU law is interpreted uniformly
throughout the Union).
254. Brussels Regulation, supra note 39, art. 4.
255. See id. art. 4(1), pmbl. Recital 13. In case a US defendant is being sued before
a court in an EU member state, the court generally will apply "the national rules of
jurisdiction applicable in the territory of the Member State of the court seised." Id. pmbl.
Recital 14; see also id. art. 6.
256. See id. pmbl. Recital 4.
257. Although the European Commission ultimately seems to seek harmonization
of European civil procedure, see Richard Fentiman, Brussels I and Third States: Future
Imperfect, 13 CAM1BRIlDGE Y.B. EuR. LEGAL STUD. 65, 68 (2010-11).
258. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and
Commercial Matters, 2007 O.J. (L339/3) art. 1(3) [hereinafter Lugano Convention].
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referred to as the Brussels regime.2 59 With the current regulation
implementing significant changes to its predecessors, the uniformity
between the Lugano Convention and Brussels Regulation desists. As
of now, it is unclear if there are plans to revise the Lugano Convention
to continue this consistency.26 0
2. Domestic Jurisdictional Rules
Alongside the EU regime, EU member states continue to use their
own national rules for domestic cases, as well as when the defendant
is domiciled in a non-EU country.261 It is beyond the scope of this
Article to describe each EU member state's national jurisdictional
rules in detail; therefore, the following analysis will focus on the
Brussels Regulation, but it will take into account some underlying
characteristics of European civil law countries' domestic civil
procedure rules.
Unlike the United States, some European countries, such. as
Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, and Italy, use distinctive provisions
to determine international competence when foreign parties are
involved.262 To the chagrin of third-state defendants, these provisions
sometimes lead to rules that are just as, and sometimes more,
exorbitant than the US minimum contacts rule, such as jurisdiction
based on the nationality of the plaintiff or the presence of the
defendant's property in certain European countries. 263 In one
particularly infamous case, a paternity suit was brought against
French Alpine skier, Jean-Claude Killy, based on undergarments left
259. See, e.g., Giesela Riihl, Judicial Cooperation in Civil and Commercial Matters
after Brexit: Which Way Forward?, 67 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 99, 125 (2018) (discussing
application of the Lugano Convention in the UK following Brexit).
260. See Peter Gottwald, Europdisches Zivilprozessrecht, in 3 MUNCHENER
KOMMENTAR ZUR ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG 1930 (Wolfgang Kriger & Thomas Rauscher
eds., 2016) (Ger.) (saying the Lugano Convention's revision seems uncertain).
261. On the unsuccessful attempt to extend the Regulation's jurisdiction rules to
non-EU member states, see Baumgartner, supra note 32, at 38 (noting "it is not
surprising that one argument against unilaterally limiting [th[e] effects [of exorbitant
jurisdiction rules] by the European Union has been to retain this bargaining chip for
negotiations with the United States"); see also Commission Proposal for a Regulation of
the European Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters, COM (2010) (Dec. 14,
2010) [hereinafter Commission Proposal], https://eur-lex.europa.eullegal-
content/EN/TXT/?
uri=CELEX%3A52010PCO748 [https://perma.cc/J4QS-6ACN] (archived Aug. 25, 2018);
Pietro Franzina, The Recast of the Brussels I Regulation: Old and New Features of the
European Regime on Jurisdiction and the Recognition of Judgements, LETTERS
BLOGATORY (June 27, 2013), https://lettersblogatory.com/author/pfranzina/
[https://perma.cclW3JS-VQNV] (archived Aug. 25, 2018).
262. See SCHACK, supra note 61, at 180.
263. For a list of exorbitant rules of jurisdiction provided by the EU Member States
according to the Brussels Regulation, see Brussels Regulation, supra note 39, art.
76(1)(a).
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in Austria.264 This and other exorbitant grounds of jurisdiction have
been extensively criticized, particularly by US scholars.265 Still, some
European authors defend them as necessary to provide effective access
to justice for plaintiffs, regardless as to whether they are domestic or
foreign, such as by basing jurisdiction on the place where the
defendant's assets can be seized.266 Among EU member states, the
Brussels Regulation explicitly excludes these exorbitant grounds of
jurisdiction, such as those based on the nationality of the plaintiff or
the localization or detention of property within the forum state.26 7
The European Commission in its draft proposal for the Brussels
Regulation Recast (the Recast) had envisioned abolishing exorbitant
jurisdiction rules, not only among EU member states, as stipulated in
Article 5(2) of the current Regulation, but also in relation to
nonmember countries.2 68 The extension of the Regulation's general
rules of personal jurisdiction to third-state defendants was one of the
most controversial aspects of the Recast. It was ultimately abandoned
because a majority of stakeholders during the Regulation's
consultation process favored leaving recognition and enforcement of
264. See Stanley E. Cox, Why Properly Construed Due Process Limits on Personal
Jurisdiction Must Always Trump Contrary Treaty Provisions, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1177, 1186
(1998) (summarizing the case). It is noteworthy that Austria since 1983 requires that
the asset's vu. tte to the claim. SCHACK, supra note 61, at 145.
265. See Patrick J. Borchers, Comparing Personal Jurisdiction in the United
States and the European Community: Lessons for American Reform, 40 AM. J. COMP. L.
121, 138-43 (1992) [hereinafter Borchers Comparing] (criticizing some aspects of the
Brussels Convention, but still proposing it as a model preferable to American
constitutionalizing of jurisdiction); see also Cox, supra note 264, at 1184 n. 28. See
generally Kevin M. Clermont & John R. B. Palmer, Exorbitant Jurisdiction, 58 ME. L.
REV. 474 (2006) (discussing the exorbitant power exercised by the United States, France,
and most of the rest of the world).
266. See Patzina, supra note 51, at 250 (arguing against proposals to exclude
jurisdiction based on assets of minimal value from sec. 23 ZPO); see also SCHACK, supra
note 61, at 147 (pointing towards cases, where US and British companies were able to
successfully seize assets of the National Iranian Oil Company in German banks based
on the German exorbitant jurisdiction rule based on localization of property in sec. 23
ZPO).
267. See Brussels Regulation, supra note 39, art. 5(2), art. 76(l)(a); see also 2015
O.J. (L C 4/2) (listing the exorbitant rules of jurisdiction provided by the Member States
according to art. 76(1)(a)).
268. See Commission Proposal, supra note 261 (proposing to abolishing exorbitant
jurisdictional rules). Ironically, the positions of third country defendants under the
Regulation recast is now even worse than under its predecessor. The abolition of the
exequatur requirement among Member States in the recast magnifies the negative effect
of domestic exorbitant jurisdiction rules for third party defendants. See Borchers, supra
note 2, at 9-10 ("A United States or Canadian defendant being sued in an EU court
invoking an exorbitant jurisdictional basis could have, at one time, simply ignored the
proceeding as long as the defendant did not have any assets in the forum nation, because
other nations would likely have refused to recognize such a judgement. However, a
similarly situated defendant no longer has that luxury unless the defendant does not
have any assets in the EU because such judgements now circulate even more freely
among the Member States."). But see SCHACK, supra note 61, at 42 (noting in practice no
such case has occurred yet).
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third-state judgments and related questions to a multilateral
framework, the reasons for which included-not least of all-the
strengthening of the European Union's position at the negotiating
table.269 In light of the Supreme Court's revised minimum contacts
test, the EU member states might be willing to reconsider their
exorbitant jurisdiction rules with regard to third-party states.270
Those EU countries that do not have specific rules for
international cases typically use the same jurisdiction rules for
domestic and international cases.27 1 On its face, this seems identical to
the US approach to personal jurisdiction, where the same rules
determine personal jurisdiction over foreign and domestic out-of-state
defendants.27 2 However, the principle of dual-functionality in some
European domestic codifications recognizes that the international
character of a case may require applying the internal rules differently
in an international context.273 The rationale behind the differentiation
is evocative of some of the criticism that has been expressed about the
application of the US minimum contacts rule to alien corporations.
Requiring a defendant to stand trial in a different court while
nevertheless within his "home" jurisdiction may still be inconvenient
or impractical as a matter of law. Therefore, the territorial distribution
of jurisdiction within the same country-much like that between courts
within any US state-is a question of venue rather than personal
jurisdiction.274 Facing a lawsuit in a foreign country, however, has far-
reaching consequences on the outcome of the case past inconvenience.
Not only will the defendant have to deal with unfamiliar procedural
rules, the forum state's conflict of law rules will also determine the
material law applicable to the case.27 5
269. See Baumgartner, supra note 32, at 38 (noting "it is not surprising that one
argument against unilaterally limiting [th[e] effects [of exorbitant jurisdiction rules] by
the European Union has been to retain this bargaining chip for negotiations with the
United States"); see also Commission Proposal, supra note 261 (proposing to abolish
exorbitant jurisdiction rules); Franzina, supra note 261 (stating the Parliament and the
majority of Member States favored pursuing further harmonization through negotiation
of a global regime, "along the lines of the (unsuccessful, but recently revived) Judgment
Project of the Hague Conference on Private International Law").
270. See Baumgartner, supra note 32, at 38 (stating that because of the changed
"transnational litigation landscape .... Europeans should now have . . . less of an
interest in limiting the judicial jurisdiction of U.S. courts").
271. This is so-called dual-functionality. See SCHACK, supra note 61, at 182
(referencing German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, French and Austrian codifications).
272. See supra Part III.A.
273. See SCHACK, supra note 61, at 102-03. German personal jurisdiction rules
have a dual functionality. If according to the domestic rules a local court is competent to
judge a case, this generally indicates the court's international competence. However, the
specific circumstances of the international case may lead a court to acknowledge or deny
jurisdiction. Id.
274. See sources cited supra note 47 and accompanying text.
275. See SCHACK, supra note 61, at 104 (pointing towards the different interests
at stake in international and domestic personal jurisdiction cases).
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Moreover, unlike in inter-European cases with reciprocal
recognition of judgments under the Brussels Regulation, 276 and
different still from judgment recognition between US states under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, the recognition of a foreign judgment
from a third-country court is not always guaranteed. 277 Although
generally applied restrictively, dual-functionality can lead a local court
to acknowledge its international competence even if it would deny
personal jurisdiction in a purely domestic case. A German court, for
example, declared that it was competent to judge a case between a
plaintiff and defendant, both domiciled in Germany, regarding a rental
property located in Serbia. Though German procedural rules in
domestic disputes concerning lease relationships provide exclusive
jurisdiction to the court "in the jurisdiction of which the spaces are
situate [d] ,"278 the German court found it had international competence
because a judgment by the Serbian court (at the time of the dispute
Yugoslavian) would not have been recognized in Germany due to lack
of reciprocity.27 9
The denial of international jurisdiction despite territorial
competence is unlikely, since it would amount to forum non
conveniens-a concept largely rejected by European civil law
countries-or would overlap with lack of judicial power. 280 Whether
special jurisdiction rules, or an adapted version of dual-functionality
for international cases, are a viable option ,rl' '- the US paradigm of
personal jurisdiction is an open question. The following subparts
examine the degree of convergence between the US and European
approaches and discuss if under the renovated US and EU paradigms
there is an increased prospect for harmonization of US and EU rules,
276. Brussels Regulation, supra note 39, art. 36(1) stipulates: "A judgment given
in a Member State shall be recognized in the other Member States without any special
procedure being required."
277. See Baumgartner, supra note 32, at 7-9 ("U.S. judgments do not always fare
well abroad" while '[i]n the United States, on the other hand, courts long ago developed
a liberal regime for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments."'); see also
Feldman, supra note 17, at 2207-14 (describing the current state of review of foreign
judgements by US courts under the mirror-image rule); S.I. Strong, Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in U.S. Courts: Problems and Possibilities, 33 REV.
LITIG. 45, 50 (2014) (noting "the current U.S. approach to recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments involves a great deal of cost, complexity, and uncertainty, which
creates numerous problems for both U.S. and foreign parties.").
278. Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] [Code of Civil Procedure], § 29a, translation at
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch-zpo/englisch-Zpo.pdf.
279. SCHACK, supra note 61, at 267.
280. See Patzina, supra note 51, at 210; see also Wendy Kennett, Forum Non
Conveniens in Europe, 54 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 552, 574-75 (1995) (pointing to a French case,
where the court refused to apply art. 14 Code civil [Civil Code] (Fr.) "based on an unusual
conception of fraudulent evasion of the law"); infra pp. 1291-93 and accompanying
footnotes.
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or whether-despite the Supreme Court's increased consideration for
other nations' laws-the differences are still too big.281
B. Characteristics
The following subparts identify the Brussels Regulation's
characteristics and the underlying systemic differences between
personal jurisdiction in the European Union and the United States.
They analyze how the EU approach compares to the US rules and how
far it could be made useful to address some of the shortcomings of the
current US regime.
1. Harmonization and Right to a Fair Trial
Contrary to the US system with its emphasis on constitutional due
process and "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,"28 2
the Brussels Regulation provides a uniform set of detailed rules, which
not only limits but also replaces domestic jurisdiction rules. 283 In
accordance with the overall goals of the European Union, the Brussels
Regulation aims at overcoming "[c]ertain differences between 'national
rules governing jurisdiction and recognition of judgments'28 4 in order
to create a common European market and enhance access to justice for
European citizens."28 5
As one commentator observed, the U.S. Constitution and the
Brussels Regulation operate on different functional levels.286 Setting
jurisdictional rules like those that the Brussels Regulation provides is
a function of state or federal law in the United States, while limitations
on jurisdiction originate in the U.S. Constitution.2 87 In the European
Union, constitutional limitations are a matter of the member state's
constitutional law or the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR). 288 Article 6 of the ECHR guarantees the right to a fair trial,2 89
281. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 141 (2014) (referencing EU rules
to support its restrictions on US rules of general jurisdiction).
282. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923 (2011).
283. See sources cited supra note 248 and accompanying text.
284. Brussels Regulation, supra note 39, pmbl. Recital 4.
285. See id. pmbl. Recital 1 & 2.
286. See Michaels, supra note 8, at 1017-18 (arguing that Brussels Regulation and
U.S. Constitution operate on two different functional levels and therefore cannot be
compared).
287. See Feldman, supra note 17, at 105 (arguing that the "constitutionalization"
of personal jurisdiction is the biggest difference between US and EU jurisdiction law and
"restricts the American's ability to 'treatify' it"); see also Michaels, supra note 8, at 1019.
288. See generally CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]
(providing fundamental freedom and human rights protections submitted by the Council
of Europe).
289. See Andreas Fisahn, Hierarchy or Network-On the Relationship of the
National to the European Legal System, 21(1) EUROPEAN J. CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES
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but as mentioned above, has played an insignificant role in limiting
jurisdiction over foreign defendants thus far.29 0
These functional differences do not mean that the Brussels
Regulation and U.S. Constitution could not be compared regarding
personal jurisdiction,291 or that personal jurisdiction in the European
Union lacks constitutional control as some commentators claim. 292
Differences are subtle and there is significant overlap between the two
functional levels.
First, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) applies the Brussels
Regulation in accordance with the standards set forth in the ECHR
and thus incidentally examines compliance with the fundamental
rights codified in the ECHR.293
Second, in the United States, as a federal system there is a
"perceived need to prevent one state from encroaching on the
prerogatives of another,"294 which, according to the Supreme Court, is
a requirement stemming from constitutional due process.29 5 In the
European Union, the Brussels Regulation, coordinating jurisdictional
power among the sovereign member states, fulfills this need.296
Third, the scope of constitutional due process rights in the United
States differs considerably from those in European member states
protected under both the ECHR and each state's national constitution.
The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clauise is significantly
broader than the so-called "right to a fair trial" in Article 6(1) of the
ECHR or domestic constitutional laws of European member states. 297
(2015), http://webjcli.org/article/view/413/527#_ftnrefl8 [https://perma.cc/KHN7-
2WAM] (archived Aug. 25, 2018) (stating European law has precedence over basic
German laws, but not over German constitutional laws); Gerald L. Neuman,
Understanding Global Due Process, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 383-84 (2009) (explaining
the relationship between protection of constitutional rights under the domestic
constitutions of EU Member States and EU standards for the protection of individual
rights).
290. See Michaels, supra note 8, at 1018 (noting art. 6(1) ECHR "has the potential
to perform the same functions as the Due Process Clause in the United States').
291. But see id. at 1018 ("[F]or Nuyts, it follows that the U.S. Constitution and the
Brussels Regulation cannot be meaningfully compared, because they are not functionally
equivalent. A proper approach must compare rules serving the same functions.").
292. See id. ("It is often claimed that ... constitutional control of jurisdiction is
absent or at least deficient in the European context.").
293. See Ulrich Magnus, Introduction, in 1 EUROPEAN COMMENTARIES ON PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 47 (Ulrich Magnus & Peter Mankowski eds., 2016) [hereinafter
ECPIL].
294. Juenger, supra note 248, at 527.
295. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 289, 294 (1980)
(referring to "the Due Process Clause ... as an instrument of interstate federalism").
296. See sources cited supra note 252 and accompanying text.
297. ECHR, supra note 288, art. 6(1) ("In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established
by law[.]"); see GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 103(1) (Ger.) ("In the courts every
person shall be entitled to a hearing in accordance with law.").
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Article 6 expressively distinguishes between a civil (subarticle 1) and
criminal (subarticles 2 and 3) limb. In civil cases, Article 6(1) primarily
guarantees a right of access to a court. In the words of the ECHR, the
right to a fair trial "requires that litigants should have an effective
judicial remedy enabling them to assert their civil rights."2 98 The
ECHR has acknowledged "that the requirements inherent in the
concept of a 'fair hearing' are not necessarily the same in cases
concerning the determination of civil rights and obligations as they are
in cases concerning the determination of a criminal charge."299 While
the criminal limb focuses on protecting the accused's procedural rights,
the civil limb tends to impose positive rights. It includes the principle
of legal certainty and a right to a fair hearing as reflected in the
Brussels Regulation.300 Article 6(1) has also been used as a basis to
argue for a forum necessitatis under the Brussels Regulation in cases
where the plaintiff would not be able to effectively bring his claim
otherwise.30 1
The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, in contrast,
is commonly understood as applying a negative right to limit
governmental overreach in both criminal and civil matters.302 This
explains why the Brussels Regulations focuses on access to justice and
predictable rules as expression of a fair trial, while the Supreme Court,
through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, focuses
increasingly on limiting overly broad personal jurisdiction rules at the
state level in the sole interest of the defendant. Though nothing
prevents the Supreme Court from adjusting its minimum contacts test
to also account for plaintiffs' interests, 303 due to the functional
298. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDE ON ARTICLE 6 OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 18 (Dec. 31, 2017) [hereinafter ECtHR].
299. See id. at 45 ("The Contracting States have greater latitude when dealing
with civil cases concerning civil rights and obligations than they have when dealing with
criminal cases.").
300. See id.; see also supra Part TV.B.2. & IV.B.3.
301. See Gottwald, supra note 260, at 1952 (arguing for forum necessitates in cases
where a plaintiff will not be able to execute a decision from a competent court based on
the executing state's order public).
302. See David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 864, 888 (1986) (concluding that the U.S. Constitution, "unlike the German, is a
constitution of negative rather than positive liberties"); see also Gerda Kleijkamp,
Comparing the Application and Interpretation of the United States Constitution and the
European Convention on Human Rights, 12 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 307, 318
(2002) (suggesting that the different approaches may stem from the fact "that the
international law of human rights explicitly recognizes positive obligations of national
governments to promote the general social welfare of their citizens; a doctrine to which
the European Court, as an international judicial body protecting human rights, obviously
adheres. American constitutional rights, on the other hand, are negative, at least
according to the more conservative interpreters of the meaning of the Constitution, and
provide protection against abuse by the government, without imposing affirmative
obligations on the government to guarantee each individual's basic human needs.").
303. See generally R. D. Rees, Plaintiff Due Process Rights in Assertions of
Personal Jurisdiction, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405 (2003).
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differences, the Supreme Court is unlikely to develop a system of
detailed jurisdiction rules providing positive rights similar to those in
the Brussels Regulation. This would require action from either
Congress at the federal level or its state-level counterparts. 304
Proposals have been made in literature and commentary, but thus far
have not gained much traction.3 05
2. Predictability, Legal Certainty, and Judicial Discretion
Under the Brussels Regulation, the general rule of jurisdiction is
that a court may impose personal jurisdiction if the forum includes the
defendant's domicile.306 Under the principle of actor sequitur forum rei,
and in the interest of defendant protection, the plaintiff generally has
to sue the defendant in the latter's domicile.30 7 Departure from this
general rule under settled EU law requires "well-defined situations in
which the subject-matter of the dispute or the autonomy of the parties
warrants a different connecting factor." 308 This has led to an
exhaustive list of carefully defined special heads of jurisdiction in the
Brussels Regulation, and predictability has developed into a distinctive
feature of EU jurisdiction rules.
SI ' he obvious appeal of predictable rules,3 09 the Brussels
regime is not without criticism. In particular, commentators from
common law jurisdictions have criticized it for favoring harmonization
and predictability without providing an "optimal solution of practical
problems."3 10 Static jurisdiction rules that point to a single forum to
resolve disputes between parties from two different states or countries,
like those in the Brussels Regulation, seem incompatible with
traditional common law notions of judicial discretion, allowing a court
304. See J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 885 (2011) (noting
that "assuming it were otherwise empowered to legislate on the subject, the Congress
could authorize the exercise of jurisdiction in appropriate courts").
305. See Borchers, supra note 2, at 20 (stating, "[flederal legislation might well be
able to overcome the J. McIntyre decision").
306. Brussels Regulation, supra note 39, art. 4(1).
307. See Case C-412/98, Group Josi Reinsurance Company SA v Universal General
Insurance Company, 2000 E.C.R. 1-5925, 1 35 (arguing that jurisdiction at the
defendant's domicile "makes it easier, in principle, for a defendant to defend himself');
P. Jenard, Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters, OJ C 59/1 18 (1979).
308. Brussels Regulation, supra note 39, pmbl. Recital 15; see Case C-412/98,
Group Josi Reinsurance Company SA v. Universal General Insurance Company, 2000
E.C.R. 1-5925, 1 36 ("It is only by way of derogation from that fundamental principle,
that the courts of the Contracting State in which the defendant has its domicile or seat
are to have jurisdiction, that the Convention provides, . . . for the cases, exhaustively
listed. . .. ").
. 309. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) ("[s]imple jurisdictional
rules ... promote greater predictability.").
310. See Fentiman, supra note 257, at 84 (criticizing the EU Commission's
approach as "harmonizing for its own sake").
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to determine jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis for fairness at the expense
of predictability. 311 In line with this, the Supreme Court in McIntyre
stated, "The defendant's conduct and the economic realities of the
market the defendant seeks to serve will differ across cases, and
judicial exposition will, in common-law fashion, clarify the contours of
that principle."3 12
While the Brussels Regulation's pragmatic approach is axiomatic
to civil law jurists,3 1 3 it can appear insufficiently "flexible to respond to
the complexity of cross-border litigation" from a common law
perspective.3 14 As a result, the Regulation reflects an overall rejection
of judicial discretion, which, while deeply rooted in common law, runs
counter to civil law tradition as well as the constitutional law of civil
law countries and their concern for legal certainty. 315 European
reservation about judicial discretion is exemplified in the European
attitude to forum non conveniens. German constitutional law provides,
"No one may be removed from the jurisdiction of his lawful judge."3 16
This provision is understood to bar German courts from declining
jurisdiction in cases where, if appearing in a common law court, a judge
could invoke forum non conveniens because he or she considers another
forum more appropriate to decide the case.3 17
The ECJ's jurisprudence reflects this view. In a decision on the
interpretation of the Brussels Convention, the Brussels Regulation's
predecessor, the court decided:
[T]he Brussels Convention precludes a court of a Contracting State from
declining the jurisdiction conferred on it by Article 2 of that convention on the
ground that a court of a non-Contracting State would be a more appropriate
forum for the trial of the action even if the jurisdiction of no other Contracting
311. See Silberman Impact, supra note 32, at 333 (stating while European
jurisdiction rules, apart from jurisdiction at the domicile of the defendant, try to provide
a single forum to the plaintiff, "a defendant is often amenable to specific jurisdiction in
a number of places").
312. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 885 (2011).
313. See James R. Maxeiner, Imagine Judges that Apply Law: How They Might Do
It, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 469, 471-73 (2009) (contrasting American judicial lawmaking
to the way German judges apply law to facts, requiring a system of precise legal rules).
314. Fentiman, supra note 257, at 86.
315. See generally James R. Maxeiner, Legal Certainty: A European Alternative to
American Legal Indeterminacy? 15 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 541 (2006-07).
316. Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], art. 101(1)2, translation at
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englischgg/index.html; see also Kennett, supra note
280, at 560 (noting in other European legal systems "the constitutional imperative is
stressed less . . .but disapproval of a discretion in relation to jurisdiction is widespread").
317. See GEIMER, supra note 48, at 136-37 (noting that forum non conveniens is
unconstitutional under German law); see also Strauss, supra note 37, at 383 n.33
('"Convenience' factors include the private interests of the litigants, ease of access to
sources of proof, ease and expense of compelling reluctant witnesses to attend
proceedings, expense of transporting willing witnesses, and the enforceability of
judgment once it is obtained.").
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State is in issue or the proceedings have no connecting factors to any other
Contracting State.
3 18
Thus, within the sphere of application of the Convention, the ECJ
excludes recourse to forum non conveniens by courts in EU member
states-including those in common law countries, which normally
would apply the doctrine.319 During the overhaul of the Regulation, the
European Parliament had advocated for a rule that would have allowed
a court in a European member state to decline jurisdiction if it
considered that the courts of another member state were better placed
to rule on the dispute in question. 320 The final version of the
Regulation's Recast did not, however, retain this proposition.
321
Although common law EU member states made concessions
during the initial negotiations, it seems less certain, when judgment
treaty negotiations resume with the United States and other non-EU
common law countries on one side of the table and civil law countries
on the other, whether negotiators will be able to overcome this
fundamentally different attitude toward judicial discretion. However,
US commentators have already suggested "retiring forum non
conveniens."3 22 Against the backdrop of recent restrictions on personal
jurisdiction by the Supreme Court, there is less need, they have
argued, to revert to forum non conveniens for US courts.3 23 As a result,
the concessions made by common law countries in the European Union
could serve as another argument that forum non conveniens may be
less entrenched in common law jurisprudence than many assume and
that differences between civil and common law, in this respect, are not
unsurmountable.324
While US and European rules are arguably moving closer towards
harmonization on predictability and judicial discretion, subtle
differences remain. For example, look to the Supreme Court's "at home
test" to establish general jurisdiction over foreign corporate defendants
318. Case C-281/02, Owusu v. Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. 1-1383, ¶ 46.
319. See Jan Wouters & Cedric Ryngaert, Litigation for Overseas Corporate
Human Rights Abuses in the European Union: The Challenge of Jurisdiction, 40 GEO.
WASH. INT'L L. REV. 939, 961 (2009) (". . . on the ground that another forum, either in
another EU member state or in a non-member state, is more appropriate . . . ").
320. A similar provision is part of Regulation (EU) No 650/2012, 2012 O.J. (L
201/107) (Succession Regulation), sec. 6.
321. See Gottwald, supra note 260, at 1952.
322. See generally Maggie Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, 92 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 390 (2017).
323. See id. at 291 (suggesting a diminished need for forum non conveniens); see
also Peter B. Rutledge, With Apologies to Paxton Blair, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1063,
1074 (2013) (concluding that forum non conveniens "would [now] appear to be of limited
use to foreign defendants who already have firmer protections as a result
of Goodyear and Nicastro").
324. See Gardner, supra note 322, at 398 ("Forum non conveniens does not have
the deep historical roots that many-including the Supreme Court-seem to have
assumed.").
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as compared to the Brussels Regulation's rules for general jurisdiction
over corporations or other legal persons. The Supreme Court in
Goodyear stated, "For an individual, the paradigm forum for the
exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual's domicile; for a
corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is
fairly regarded as at home."325 The Court continued: "With respect to
a corporation, the place of incorporation and principal place of business
are 'paradig[m] . . . bases for general jurisdiction."' 326 This sounds
strikingly similar to Article 4(1) of the Brussels Regulation: "Subject to
this Regulation, persons domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever
their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State."327 For
corporations, Article 63(1) specifies:
. . . a company or other legal person or association of natural or legal persons is
domiciled at the place where it has its:
(a) statutory seat;
(b) central administration; or
(c) principal place of business.3 2 8
"Statutory seat" means the place where a company is incorporated or
registered.3 2 9 Central administration is the criterion most commonly
used in the domestic conflict of law rules of individual EU member
states to determine the law applicable to corporations. 330 Accordingly,
though interpretations under the Brussels Regulation need to be
autonomous, central administration is commonly referred to as the
place where the company effectively is managed and controlled.33 1 A
corporation's principal place of business is where the main business
activities are located.3 3 2 According to a decision by the ECJ, a branch,
325. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 136-37 (2014).
326. Id.
327. Brussels Regulation, supra note 39, art. 4(1).
328. See id. Since the term "statutory seat" is used in most EU member states, but
not in Ireland, Cyprus, or the United Kingdom, art. 63(2) specifies: "For the purposes of
Ireland, Cyprus and the United Kingdom, 'statutory seat' means the registered office or,
where there is no such office anywhere, the place of incorporation or, where there is no
such place anywhere, the place under the law of which the formation took place." Id. art.
63(2).
329. See Paul Vlas, Article 63, in ECPIL 993, 994-95.
330. See generally Werner F. Ebke, The Real Seat Doctrine in the Conflict of
Corporate Laws, 36 INT'L L. 1015 (2002). While the common law member states and the
Netherlands follow the incorporation theory, i.e., the nationality of a company is
determined based on the place where it is registered, other member states follow what
is called the "real seat" theory, i.e., the law of the country where the company is actually
managed. Id.
331. See Vias, supra note 329, at 995 (stating the term should not be "treated
identical to the concepts of the national systems of private international law").
332. Id. at 995; see also Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) No 09/2005, Draft
Opinion of the European Safety Agency (Dec. 6, 2005), https://www.easa.europa.eu/
sites/default/files/dfulNPA-09-2005.pdf [https://perma.cclZ5BF-GASG] (archived Aug.
25, 2018) ("[It is a general understanding that the concept of principal place of business
should be construed to mean a permanent and regular place of transacting of general
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agency, or other establishment does not qualify as a corporation's
domicile under Article 63.333 Article 63(1) does not permit "piercing the
jurisdictional veil" to establish general jurisdiction over the parent via
its dependent branch in a European Union member state.
334 In this
regard, the Brussels Regulation differentiates between general
jurisdiction, which, according to Articles 4(1) and 63, is limited to the
corporation's domicile, and specific jurisdiction-special jurisdiction in
the terms of the Regulation-at the place where the dependent
establishment is located.3 3 5 Thus, a company headquartered in the
United States with a branch in Germany would not be subject to
general jurisdiction in the European Union, but could be sued in
Germany for a specific claim related to the operations of the branch
based on special jurisdiction according to domestic German law of civil
procedure.336
If a corporation's statutory seat, central administration, and
principal place of business are located in different EU member states,
the plaintiff has the choice between all of them.33 7 All three potentially
connecting factors need to be decided by the forum.338 The statutory
determine, but central administration and principle
place of business can raise factual issues.3 39 Thus, even the allegedly
predictable EU rules carry some inherent uncertainty. Nevertheless,
under the Brussels Regulation a potential defendant corporation is
business, and would not'include a temporary place of sojourn during ad hoc negotiations.
It should as well indicate where is the seat of the management of the interests of the
organization or its guiding activity.").
333. Case 33/78, Somafur SA v. Saar-Ferngas, 1978 E.C.R. 2183-93.
334. That follows from art. 7 (5). See Brussels Regulation, supra note 39; see also
Lea Brilmayer & Kathleen Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction and Substantive Legal
Relations: Corporations, Conspiracies, and Agency, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1, 14, 10, 25 (1986)
(noting merging parent and subsidiary for jurisdictional purposes requires an inquiry
"comparable to the corporate law question of piercing the corporate veil").
335. See Vlas, supra note 329, at 995 (pointing to the difference between art. 63
and 7(5) and referencing an erroneous decision by Court d'Appel [Court of Appeals] [CA]
Versailles, Sept. 26, 1991, Revue Critique de Droit International Priv6 [RCDP] (1992)).
336. ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], § 23, translation
at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englischzpo/englisch-zpo.pdf; see also Peter
Mankowski, Article 7, in ECPIL 121, 353 [hereinafter Mankowski Article 7] ("The
principal place of business of a company [here, the independent subsidiary] already
constitutes a general jurisdiction and can thus, by the very logic and the opening words
of [alrt. 5, not be used in order to establish special jurisdiction.").
337. See Gottwald, supra note 260, at 2147 (noting that if a plaintiff were to bring
suit based on these three alternative grounds of jurisdiction in multiple fori, the second
court seized would have to stay its proceedings according to Brussels Regulation, art.
29(1)).
338. Id.
339. See Vlas, supra note 329, at 995 (Principal place of business "means the place
where the main business activities are located. This notion is also factual and could give
rise to problems, which have to be solved by the forum.").
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assured that the three connecting factors stipulated in Article 63(1) are
exhaustive and fairly predictable.340
In the United States, it remains unclear how "principal place of
business" is defined and how the notion relates to a corporation's
"home."341 Three out of the four relevant general jurisdiction cases the
Supreme Court has decided to date-Perkins, Helicopteros, and
Daimler-presented unique circumstances. 342 They are "limited by
their facts" and are "poor case[s] from which to generalize."343 The "at
home" test introduced in Goodyear and reaffirmed in Daimler remains
open to interpretation. In fact, the Supreme Court's reasoning is
somewhat circular. In Daimler the Court stated, "A court may assert
general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country)
corporations" when the corporation is "essentially at home in the forum
State."34 4 With reference to an individual's domicile, the Court then
went on to explain that the "paradigm forum for the exercise of general
jurisdiction" is a place "in which the corporation is fairly regarded as
at home"345 and "the place of incorporation and principal place of
business are 'paradig[m] . . . bases for general jurisdiction.' 34 6 Should
this lead to conclude that a corporation has its principal place of
business where it is at home?
Though the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's agency approach to
establishing general jurisdiction in Daimler,3 47 it did not expressly
exclude other ways of establishing derivative jurisdiction over the
foreign parent through an independent subsidiary in the forum
state.34 8 Under the "at home test," it seems perfectly conceivable for a
court in the United States to establish general personal jurisdiction
over a foreign parent based on its in-state subsidiary, if, for example,
decision-makers in both companies were identical or the parent in fact
340. See Brussels Regulation, supra note 39, pmbl. Recital 15 ("The rules of
jurisdiction should be highly predictable and founded on the principle that jurisdiction
is generally based on the defendant's domicile. Jurisdiction should always be available
on this ground save in a few well-defined situations in which the subject-matter of the
dispute or the autonomy of the parties warrants a different connecting factor. The
domicile of a legal person must be defined autonomously so as to make the common rules
more transparent and avoid conflicts of jurisdiction.").
341. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92-93 (2010) (holding that for
diversity jurisdiction purposes, "principal place of business" is the "nerve center" of a
corporation, "the place where a corporation's officers direct, control, and coordinate the
corporation's activities").
342. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 142 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (agreeing "with the Court's conclusion that the Due Process Clause prohibits
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Daimler in light of the unique circumstances of
this case") (emphasis added).
343. Borchers General Jurisdiction, supra note 101, at 124-25.
344. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 122.
345. Id. at 137.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 135.
348. Id. at 137.
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controlled the legally independent subsidiary. 3 49 Under European
rules, such a de facto branch could establish special jurisdiction over
the parent at the place where the dependent establishment is
situated,3 50 but not general jurisdiction over the parent at the place
where the dependent entity is situated as the "at home test"
suggests.35 1
Finally, the Supreme Court in Daimler, despite advocating for
more predictable rules, provides ample room for exceptions to its rule:
"We do not foreclose the possibility that in an exceptional case . . . a
corporation's operations in a forum other than its formal place of
incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial and
of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State."35 2
This remark, once again, evidences the Court's attachment to judicial
discretion. 353 While such uncertainty is inconceivable under the
exhaustive enumeration of connecting factors in Article 63(1) of the
Brussels Regulation, it opens the door to inconsistent interpretation
and application by lower courts in the United States. The definitional
uncertainty justifies why foreign defendants continue to worry
the reach of long-armed jurisdiction in the United States, and feeds
international commentators' skepticism regarding the Supreme
Court's retrenchment from overly broad general jurisdiction.35 4
3. Efficiency, Access to Justice, and Balancing Competing Interests
As discussed in the previous subpart, both Supreme Court
precedent as of Goodyear and Daimler and the Brussels Regulation in
Article 4(1) limit general jurisdiction over foreign corporate defendants
to the corporation's domicile, though the way they identify that
domicile differs, adding to legal uncertainty and leading to slightly
different results between civil and common law legal systems. 3 5 5
Differences become even more pronounced when it comes to specific
jurisdiction. In order to establish the link between the claim and the
forum necessary to establish what is now known as specific jurisdiction
under US law, the Supreme Court in International Shoe referred to
"obligations [that] arise out of or are connected with the activities
349. The issue was raised in Daimler, but ultimately not decided, because
plaintiffs never "maintained that MBUSA was an alter ego of Daimler." Id. at 134.
350. Brussels Regulation, supra note 39, art. 7(5) (stating "as regards a dispute
arising out of the operations of a branch, agency or other establishment, in the courts for
the place where the branch, agency or other establishment is situated").
351. See Mankowski Article 7, supra note 336.
352. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 127.
353. See Silberman Impact, supra note 32; see also text accompanying note 312.
354. See Zekoll & Schulz, supra note 2, at 328 (pointing towards remaining
uncertainty about what constitutes an "exceptional case" and ways to establish
derivative jurisdiction over a foreign parent company, which have not expressively been
excluded in Daimler).
355. See supra Part IV.B.2.
[VOL. 51:12431294
RECONCILING TRANSNA TIONAL JURISDICTION
within the state. . . " and has provided little by way of definition ever
since.356
The Brussels Regulation, by contrast, in typical civil law fashion
and its quest for predictability,3 5 7 does not employ "a close connection
per se" as the criterion of choice to establish specific or, in the terms of
the Regulation, "special jurisdiction." 358 In Articles 7 to 22, the
Regulation provides a detailed list of special heads of jurisdiction in
matters relating to general contracts, torts, insurance, and consumer
and employment contracts, to name just a few. It is beyond the scope
of this Article to analyze each individual head of special jurisdiction,
each of which has spurred a litany of commentary by European legal
scholars. The goal of European special jurisdiction rules, like those of
its US counterpart, specific jurisdiction, is to provide the plaintiff with
an alternative forum to the defendant's domicile in cases that involve
a particularly close connection between the case and the location of the
court deciding the matter.3 5 9 While the Supreme Court in Worldwide,
and even more so in Mclntryre and Walden, has interpreted specific
jurisdiction restrictively by limiting its application to cases where the
defendant "purposefully availed himself" of the forum where the court
entertaining jurisdiction is, 360 the Brussels Regulation's list of heads
of special jurisdiction is extensive though, for the sake of clarity,
exhaustive.3 61 To this aim, it incorporates the main objectives of the
Regulation, which is to enhance access to justice for European citizens
while simultaneously protecting defendants' expectations in an easily
predictable forum.362
A closer look at the Brussels Regulation's special jurisdiction
requirements reveal that the European approach is not about
predictability or hard and fast rules alone as a cursory examination of
356. See Borchers General Jurisdiction, supra note 101, at 126 (noting that neither
the term "connected with, nor 'arising out of are 'self-defining, nor are they necessarily
interchangeable"'); see also Feldman, supra note 17, at 2200 ("[T]he 2011 decision in J.
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro blurred the parameters of 'minimum contacts' even
further.").
357. See Brussels Regulation, supra note 39, pmbl. Recital 15 &16 ("[Tihe rules of
jurisdiction should be highly predictable.").
358. Mankowski Article 7, supra note 336, at 143 (citing Case C-288/92, Custom
Made Commercial Ltd v. Stawa Metallbau GmbH, 1994 E.C.R. 1-2913) (arguing that this
would run counter the regulation's principle of legal certainty).
359. See Brussels Regulation, supra note 39, pmbl. Recital 16 ("[T]here should be
alternative grounds ofjurisdiction based on a close connection between the court and the
action or in order to facilitate the sound administration of justice.").
360. See supra Part III.B.2.
361. See Mankowski Article 7, supra note 336, at 144.
362. See Brussels Regulation, supra note 39, pmbl. Recital 2 & 15; see also
Mankowski Article 7, supra note 336, at 144 ("[W]ith the exception of (6) all heads of
special jurisdiction contained in art. 7 vest jurisdiction in a certain court, not only in the
courts of a state. Hence, art. 7, with the exception of (6), does not only regulate
international jurisdiction, but also local jurisdiction or venue.").
2018] 1295
VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
Articles 4 to 35 may suggest.3 6 3 On the contrary, some of the special
jurisdiction rules, such as those contained in Article 7(1), (2), or (5)-
which is discussed in more detail below-are rather complex and have
given rise to extensive scholarly commentary and ECJ case law. The
Regulation focuses on the relationship between the court and the claim
in order to find the most appropriate forum as suggested by the term
"international competence."364 Evocative of Justice Sotomayor's policy
concerns,365 the European special jurisdiction rules seek to balance the
interests of plaintiffs and defendants. This is evidenced, as an example,
in Article 7(1), which provides detailed rules in contractual matters to
balance Article 4(1), which, standing alone, would otherwise one-
sidedly favor the debtor in a contractual relationship.366 Other special
jurisdiction rules aim to protect the supposedly weaker party in a
contractual relationship, such as Articles 17 to 19 (jurisdiction over
consumer contracts) or Articles 20 and 21 (contracts of employment).36 7
Other heads of special jurisdiction try to improve the sound
administration of justice and efficiency of court proceedings by
providing a forum that is closely connected to the claim, such as by
making it easier for the court to hear evidence.3 68 Some special heads
of jurisdiction, like jurisdiction in rem,36 9 even attempt to achieve
synchronization between international jurisdiction and choice of law
rules, thus avoiding the scenario where the designated judge may have
363. See Michaels, supra note 8, at 1008, 1039-52 ("European law . . .
uses hard and fast rules that are easier to apply and therefore more predictable.").
364. See sources cited supra note 45 and accompanying text; see also Ronald A.
Brand, Access to Justice on a Due Process Platform, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 76, 78-
79 (2012) [hereinafter Brand Access to Justice] ("[T]he rules of special jurisdiction found
in the Brussels I Regulation of the European Union rely on a two-way nexus between
the court and the claim."); see also Ronald A. Brand, Tort Jurisdiction in a Multilateral
Convention: The Lessons of the Due Process Clause and the Brussels Convention, 24
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 125, 154-55 (1998) (suggesting that a tort jurisdiction may build on
similarities of language and concepts between the US due process analysis for
jurisdictional purposes and the ECJ's interpretation of Article 5(3) of the Brussels
convention); Silberman Impact, supra note 32, at 331 (explaining that the European
system focuses "on the connection between the dispute and the form state," rather than
"the relationship between the individual defendant and the forum state").
365. See supra Part III.C.3.
366. See SCHACK, supra note 61, at 111 (noting that without special jurisdiction in
contractual matters, the defendant could hamper the enforcement of plaintiffs rights by
subsequent changes of domicile).
367. See Silberman Impact, supra note 32, at 332 (suggesting that though state
statutes in the United States "have not generally included special jurisdictional
provisions with respect to actions relating to employment and consumer contracts;
however, it would be in keeping with the jurisdictional standard of reasonableness for
courts to take into account at the constitutional level such factors as the relative strength
of the parties' bargaining positions").
368. See Brussels Regulation, supra note 39, pmbl. Recital 2-16 ("[Tlhere should
be alternative grounds of jurisdiction based on a close connection between the court and
the action or in order to facilitate the sound administration of justice.").
369. Id. art. 24(1).
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to apply a different body of law than the one he or she is familiar
with.37 0
While efficiency is not exactly a characteristic of the US justice
system,3 71 these other objectives are not alien to the reasoning of the
Supreme Court, which, in International Shoe, relied on "the
relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation" to
decide if jurisdiction was present and appropriate.372 In Worldwide, it
stated that due process limitations on personal jurisdiction reflect both
the right of the defendant to a fair proceeding and territorial
limitations on state power.3 73 However, in subsequent decisions, the
Supreme Court's focus has shifted to the power relationship between
the court and the defendant and balancing these competing interests,
thus focusing on protecting defendants' due process rights at the
expense of other factors.3 74 The result is that US jurisdiction rules-
against common belief-are inherently defendant-friendly. 375 The
defendant's right to due process limits any jurisdictional rule, which
would otherwise provide plaintiffs access to a wider array of courts in
the United States.37 6 With the Supreme Court's recent line of cases,
this protection for defendants has significantly increased. US courts
continue to be attractive for plaintiffs for multiple reasons, but not
because of plaintiff-friendly jurisdiction rules.3 7 7
Some of the special jurisdiction rules in the Brussels Regulation,
in contrast, clearly favor the plaintiff. Article 7(2) allows tort victims
to sue in the courts at the place where the harmful event occurred. That
place has been interpreted broadly as both the place where the harmful
event giving rise to the damage occurred, and the place where the
damage occurred. If these places are located in different member
370. See SCHACK, supra note 61, at 94, 97 (noting that the proximity of the forum
to the case will allow the court to avoid legal aid, accelerate the process, and usually lead
to a more accurate decision as the judge will be able to apply a familiar law).
371. See generally, e.g., Robert W. Emerson, The French Constat: Discovering More
Efficient Discovery, 36 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 25 (2018) (describing the inefficiency of the US
civil justice system and comparing it with the French); John H. Langbein, The German
Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 825 (1985) (comparing the
American and German system of civil litigation).
372. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
373. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 289, 294 (1980) ("Due
Process Clause ensures not only fairness, but also the 'orderly administration of the
laws."').
374. See sources cited supra note 170 and accompanying text.
375. Brand Access to Justice, supra note 364, at 79 (noting the US system is
defendant-protective, while the "rest of the world's" jurisdictional rules are plaintiff-
protective).
376. See id. at 78 ("[T]he major difference between the United States and other
countries (particularly civil law countries) on jurisdictional analysis comes in how
countries conceptualize jurisdiction itself.").
377. See id. at 79 (arguing that US jurisdiction rules do not account for the
attractiveness of US courts).
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states, the plaintiff has the privilege of choice. 378 The European
principle of ubiquity is widely discussed in the comparative procedural
law literature. US commentators have concluded that it might not hold
up under the Due Process Clause.3 79 From a European perspective, the
defendant's right to a fair trial is respected because the exhaustive list
of heads of special jurisdiction enables the defendant to reasonably
foresee where he may have to stand trial.3 80 It should also be noted,
that according to the ECJ in Fiona Shevill et al. v. Presse Alliance SA,
Article 7(2) is understood as limiting the claim to the place where the
damage occurred and to the proportion of the damage sustained in that
place.38 1 Thus, under Article 7(2), the plaintiff cannot sue in the forum
most favorable to him for damages sustained somewhere else-let
alone worldwide. This limits forum shopping and rebalances plaintiff
and defendant interests.38 2 This so-called "mosaic principle" could offer
a remedy against the Supreme Court's far-reaching restrictions on
specific jurisdiction created from cases like McIntyre.383 It could give
victims back some of their rights, which, as Justice Sotomayor notes in
her dissenting opinions, the Supreme Court takes away in the interest
of defendants' due process protection.384
In addition to heads of special jurisdiction, the Brussels
Regulation provides grounds for exclusive jurisdiction in Article 24,
meaning only the courts at the place designated in Article 24 are
competent to judge the case. Hence, exclusive jurisdiction excludes
general jurisdiction at the defendant's domicile as well as heads of
special jurisdiction and prorogation.3 85 According to Article 24, courts
have exclusive international jurisdiction: (1) "in proceedings which
have as their object rights in rem in immovable property . . . "; (2) in
378. See Case 21-76, Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier BV v. Mines de potasse d'Alsace
SA, 1976 E.C.R. 1747.
379. See Feldman, supra note 17, at 2198 ("European courts can thus exercise
jurisdiction at the place of injury whether or not the defendant purposefully directed his
conduct toward that place.").
380. See Mankowski Article 7, supra note 336, at 144.
381. Case C-68/93, Fiona Shevill et al. v. Presse Alliance SA, 1995 E.C.R. 1-415
(holding that courts competent under Brussels Convention, art. 5(3) "have jurisdiction
to rule solely in respect of the harm caused in the State of the court seized").
382. See Jan Oster, Rethinking Shevill: Conceptualising the EU Private
International Law of Internet Torts against Personality Rights, 26 INT'L REV. L.
COMPUTERS & TECH. 113, 115 (2012) (explaining the mosaic principle and noting that
"[t]he Shevill doctrine therefore considers the necessity to concentrate lawsuits aiming
at full compensation to just one-or maximally two-jurisdiction(s)"). But see Ronald A.
Brand, Due Process, Jurisdiction and a Hague Judgments Convention, 60 U. PITT. L.
REV. 661, 695 (1999) (suggesting "tort jurisdiction under Brussels Article 5(3) (as
currently interpreted) appears to be broader than U.S. due process analysis would
allow").
383. See Borchers, supra note 2, at 16-17 (suggesting this solution "would provide
a sensible and clear answer to a case such as J. McIntyre").
384. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 147 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
385. Brussels Regulation, supra note 39, art. 25(4), 26(1).
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matters of "validity of the constitution, the nullity or the dissolution of
companies or other legal persons"; (3) "the validity of entries in public
registers"; and (4) cases relating to the "registration or validity of
patents, trademarks, designs, or other similar rights."3 86
Each of these factors commonly involves registration in public
national registers or is subject to other mandatory rules in the forum
state where, for example, the property is located, or the company in
question is registered. Connecting jurisdiction to these criteria assures
application of the mandatory rules in the interest of third parties for
legal clarity, independent of the interests of the plaintiff and
defendant.3 8 7
The different approaches also become evident in the treatment of
foreign entities for the purpose of establishing specific jurisdiction over
foreign corporate defendants at issue in Bristol-Myers. Article 7(5) of
the Brussels Regulation stipulates that "a dispute arising out of the
operations of a branch, agency[,] or other establishment" can be
brought "in the courts for the place where the branch, agency [,] or other
establishment is situated." If a sufficient nexus between the parent and
the acting entity in question has been established as to qualify as a
"branch, agency[,] or establishment" under Article 7(5), the plaintiff
will be able to obtain relief against the foreign parent corporation in
the forum where he or she was harmed by the dependent subsidiary's
operations. As a result, Article 7(5) balances the interest of plaintiffs
for a convenient forum with the defendant's desire for predictability as
suggested by Justice Sotomayor in her concurring opinion in
Daimler.3 88
While Article 7(5) only applies to corporate defendants domiciled
in an EU member state, it was modeled after similar provisions in the
domestic civil procedure law of its member states.3 8 9 As a result, a US
company that is sued in an EU member state based on the activities of
its European branch or subsidiary is likely to be exposed to similar
jurisdiction rules, but should be wary of national differences.3 90
According to the ECJ's jurisprudence regarding Article 7(5) and
similar provisions in the Regulation's predecessors, an establishment
is "an entity capable of being the primary, or even exclusive,
interlocutor for third parties in the negotiation of contracts."3 9 1 "A
386. Id. art. 24.
387. See Luis de Lima Pinheiro, Article 24, in ECPIL 561.
388. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 147 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("[T]hat considerable
burden runs headlong into the majority's recitation of the familiar principle that
'[s]imple jurisdictional rules.. .promote greater predictability."').
389. See Gottwald, supra note 260, at 1981.
390. E.g., JURISDIKTIONSNORM [JN] [JURISDICTION ACT] REICHSGESETZBLATT
[RGBLI No. 111/1895, § 87(1) (Austria) (providing that a manufacturing facility is
sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction in Austria).
391. Case C-439/93, Lloyd's Register of Shipping v. Soci6t6 Campenon Bernard,
1995 E.C.R. 1-00961.
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degree of permanence is required, and a mere transitory presence does
not suffice."392 The principal does not need to own the branch, agency,
or establishment, but it needs to be "subject to the direction and control
of the parent body." 393 In other words, it needs to act "as the
decentralized and prolonged arm of the principal."
394 However, if an
independent subsidiary behaves like a dependent branch, substance
prevails over form.3 95 In this case, the subsidiary will be treated as a
dependent entity for jurisdictional purposes. Article 7(5) applies
independently from the formal legal status of the branch, agency, or
establishment.396
Whether an entity qualifies as an independent establishment is a
factual question and needs to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
39 7
As a result, Article 7(1) does not remove all uncertainty as to the
foundation of derivative jurisdiction. However, derivative special
jurisdiction is limited to dependent establishments, and the
enumeration of entities that qualify is exhaustive. While the Supreme
Court in Worldwide, McIntyre, and their progeny looked at the parent's
purposeful availment in the forum state, the Brussels Regulation
focuses on the relationship between parent and subsidiary as a
dependent entity. This makes consideration of other potential
connecting factors between the parent and the forum, such as
advertisements, sales, operating facilities, or research labs (at issue in
Bristol-Myers) obsolete.
3 98
Under the Brussels Regulation, an independent subsidiary
generally does not qualify as an establishment and therefore does not
establish jurisdiction over the parent company under Article 7(5). This
392. Mankowski Article 7, supra note 336, at 359.
393. Case C-14/76, A. De Bloos, SPRL v. Soci6td en commandite par actions
Bouyer, Tomblaine (Meurthe-et-Moselle), 1976 E.C.R. 1497.
394. Mankowski Article 7, supra note 336, at 351.
395. See id. at 354 ("Substance over form should prevail as the leading maxim if a
formally independent entity is in fact functionally operated like a dependent branch.");
see also Case 218/86, SAR Schotte GmbH v. Parfums Rothschild SARL,1987 E.C.R. 4905
(holding third parties must be able to rely on the appearance of a dependent
establishment in the course of business).
396. The legal status of the branch, agency or establishment depends on national
company law. Brussels Regulation, supra note 39, art. 7 (5) seeks to overcome national
differences in the definition of dependent and independent establishments through
autonomous interpretation. See Mankowski Article 7, supra note 336, at 354.
397. See Vlas, supra note 329, at 995. Principal place of business "means the place
where the main business activities are located. This notion is also factual and could give
rise to problems, which have to be solved by the forum." Id.
398. Brussels Regulation art. 7(1) thus also eliminates the uncertainty involved
with Justice Sotomayor's reasonable test proposed in her dissent in Bristol-Myers, while
still balancing plaintiffs' and defendants' interests. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1789 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing for a
court to have jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant the "exercise of jurisdiction must
be reasonable under the circumstances.").
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follows from Article 63(1)(c). 399 Thus, attempts to locate an
independently operating non-European subsidiary of a European
company-such as the subsidiaries party to Goodyear-in the
European Union by way of interpreting Article 63 seem misguided.400
The defendant, in order to establish jurisdiction for a claim resulting
out of the subsidiary's actions at the parent company's domicile cannot
argue that the subsidiary actually was controlled and managed at the
parent company's headquarters in the European Union. This argument
would requalify the subsidiary as a dependent establishment, which,
according to Article 7(5), establishes special jurisdiction over the
parent at the place where the establishment is situated but, by
implication, not over the subsidiary at the parent's domicile.401
Though not at issue in any of the cases decided by the Supreme
Court thus far, the outcome of the scenario described above is less clear
under Supreme Court precedent. A plaintiff who was harmed by an
independent subsidiary's actions under the "purposeful availment"
criterion could likely argue that a court at the place where the parent
corporation is located has personal jurisdiction over the parent
corporation, if the parent in fact completely controlled the decisions of
the legally independent subsidiary for the issue in question in the
particular claim against it.
Finally, the Brussels Regulation in Article 8(1) provides plaintiffs
who seek to combine identical claims against the parent and the
dependent entity, or against multiple branches in multiple
states/countries, with a unique forum against the parent and the
subsidiary or multiple dependent establishments.402 Article 8(1) is
399. See Mankowski Article 7, supra note 336, at 353 ("The principal place of
business of a company [here, the independent subsidiary] already constitutes a general
jurisdiction and can thus, by the very logic and the opening words of [a]rt. 5, not be used
in order to establish special jurisdiction.").
400. Contra Marta Requejo Isidro, Business and Human Rights Abuses: Claiming
Compensation under the Brussels IRecast, HUM. RTS. & INT'L LEGAL DISCOURSE 72, 78-
79 (2016) (noting that the ECJ's jurisprudence so far has focused on domicile of natural
persons and suggesting "to locate the domicile of the (non-European) subsidiary of a
European company in the EU, by way of interpreting art. 63"). See generally Matthias
Weller & Alexia Pato, Local Parents As Anchor Defendants' in European Courts for
Claims Against Their Foreign Subsidiaries in Human Rights and Environmental
Damages Litigation: Recent Case Law and Legislative Trends, UNIFORM L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3134361 [https://perma.cclU3CZ-PT751
(archived Aug. 25, 2018).
401. Because substance prevails over form, see Mankowski Article 7, supra note
336.
402. Brussels Regulation art. 8(1) provides: "A person domiciled in a Member State
may also be sued: (1) where he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the
place where any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely connected
that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of
irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings." See Brussels Regulation,
supra note 39, art. 8(1). See also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 142 (2014)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority opinion for burdening plaintiffs and
defendants by requiring suits in different forum states).
2018] 1301
VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
another example of the Regulation's quest for efficiency and its
objective to enhance access to justice for the plaintiff.
The European emphasis on efficiency also becomes evident in the
Brussels Regulation's rule on lis alibi pendens. 403 Under the
Regulation, if multiple European courts in different member states are
being seized for the same cause of action, any subsequent court seized
"shall . . . stay its proceedings." 404 While American law does not
recognize a formal theory of lis pendens for parallel proceedings, US
courts in international cases may stay their action based on
international comity. Thus, the American lis pendens is a counterpart
to forum non conveniens and, like the former, merely discretionary; by
comparison, the European version-reflecting adherence to the
principle of legal certainty-is mandatory.405
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's emphasis on predictability in its recent line
of personal jurisdiction cases could lead the casual observer to the
conclusion that the United States and the European Union are about
to overcome their disagreement on how to determine jurisdiction over
foreign corporate defendants-a rapprochement hat seemed unlikely
prior to 2011.406 Arguably, any presuppositions for an international
treaty on jurisdiction and recognition of judgments are better today
than they were at the time of the failed negotiations at The Hague.407
The Supreme Court in McIntyre, Goodyear, and their progeny curtailed
the "minimum contacts" rule, thus mitigating the "justice conflict"
between the United States and European civil law countries. In
Daimler, following one year after the decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co. (Kiobel), the Court also limited extraterritorial
application of the Alien Tort Statute-another point of contention
during the failed 1999 negotiations.40 8 This Article has argued that
403. Brussels Regulation, supra note 39, art. 29 ("[W]here proceedings involving
the same cause of action and between the same parties are brought in the courts of
different Member States, any court other than the court first sei[z]ed shall of its own
motion stay its proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of the court first sei[z]ed
is established.").
404. Id.
405. See Silberman Impact, supra note 32, at 340 ("Like the related common law
doctrine of forum non conveniens, the standard for this type of 'international abstention'
is a discretionary one.').
406. See Michaels, supra note 8, at 1068 (concluding in an article from 2006-prior
to the U.S. Supreme Court's latest retrenchment-that different underlying paradigms
of the US and European regime will make any international effort to unify jurisdiction
rules very difficult).
407. See Borchers, supra note 2, at 18.
408. See Baumgartner, supra note 32, at 24-25 (discussing Kiobel and its impact
on "the underlying negotiating interests at The Hague").
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because jurisdiction is inherently international, harmonization
through internationally agreed-upon norms should remain a priority.
Such norms help fight forum shopping, avoid conflict, and could resolve
such pressing questions as to which country's courts should judge
multinational companies (MNCs) for human rights violations-a main
point of contention in Daimler as well as Kiobel.409
Proponents of an international agreement should refrain from
preemptively celebrating, though: the analysis of US and EU
jurisdiction rules also has shown that differences between the US and
EU regimes remain significant. Not only do the U.S. Supreme Court
and EU legislature operate and enforce at different levels, the
characteristics of American and European jurisdiction rules are often
diametrically opposed, despite the latest considerations of
international comity by the Supreme Court. Where US law heavily
emphasizes the need for judicial discretion, European rules aim at
legal certainty and efficiency. Where the U.S. Supreme Court protects
defendants' due process rights and the sovereignty of US states, the
Brussels Regulation strives for harmonization of jurisdictional rules
between member states and access to justice for the plaintiff. These
fundamental differences help explain why further harmonization of US
jurisdiction rules with EU law remains difficult even though the
Supreme Court in Daimler seems desirous of achieving just that.4 10
Maybe most importantly, predictability, though the only
characteristic on which US and EU rules seem to converge, means
different things for the EU legislator and the Supreme Court. For the
Supreme Court it means restricting both general and specific
jurisdiction in order to expose the alien defendant to fewer potential
forums. The European regime shows that predictability does not
necessarily equal restriction. The Brussels Regulation provides a
rather lengthy but exhaustive list of special heads of jurisdiction,
thereby significantly extending what US law would call specific
jurisdiction and taking into account the interests of both defendants
and plaintiffs as well as public policy concerns. It is clearly defined
connecting factors in lieu of imprecise legal terms that make the
European rules predictable, not the limitation of circumstances under
which a domestic court can claim personal jurisdiction over a foreign
corporate defendant.
In short, in the absence of internationally agreed-upon norms, the
Brussels Regulation could serve as a model to address the
409. See also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 671, 675 (2013)
(addressing the related issue of federal court jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute);
see also Baumgartner, supra note 32, at 24-25 (noting "Goodyear and Daimler are in line
with other recent decisions in which the Court has put the brakes on long-standing lower
court practices that asserted U.S. court jurisdiction and applied U.S. law to matters with
strong connections to other countries").
410. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 141 (2014) (referencing EU rules
of general jurisdiction).
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shortcomings of the current US personal jurisdiction regime. The
criteria used in the Brussels Regulation to determine special
jurisdiction and relevant European case law interpreting such rules
could help further refine the contours of specific jurisdiction under
Supreme Court precedent or serve as a blueprint for the state or federal
legislature, at least to develop special international jurisdiction rules.
However, to achieve truly predictable and more equitable rules, any
change may require concessions with regard to judicial discretion,
which, alongside the strong focus on defendant protection in current
Supreme Court precedent, appears as the main roadblock to further
harmonization of US and European jurisdiction rules.
